[MORE IRAQ / ABU GHRAIB][THE-SIGNAL.COM][S.C.V. HISTORY IN PICTURES]
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
May 19, 2004Transcript: Abizaid, Sanchez, Miller, Warren on Iraq Prisoner Abuse
SPEAKERS:
Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va). Chairman
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)
Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.)
Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.)
Sen. Wayne Allard (R-Colo.)
Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.)
Sen. Susan M. Collins (R-Maine)
Sen. John Ensign (R-Nev.)
Sen. Jim Talent (R-Mo.)
Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.)
Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.)
Sen. Elizabeth Dole (R-N.C.)
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas)
Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) Ranking Member
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Sen. Josheph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.)
Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.)
Sen. Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii)
Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.)
Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.)
Sen. Mark Dayton (D-Minn.)
Sen. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.)
Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.)
Sen. Mark Pryor (D-Ark.)WITNESSES:
Gen. John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command
Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations, Multinational Force-Iraq
Col. Marc Warren, Army Judge Advocate General
WARNER: Good morning, everyone.
The committee meets today for the third in a series of hearings regarding the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by a small — hopefully a very small — number of personnel of the armed forces of the United States, in violation of the U.S. and international laws.
Testifying before us today are General John P. Abizaid, commander, U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander, Multinational Force-Iraq; and Major General Geoffrey Miller, deputy commander for detainee operations, Multinational Force. And they're joined this morning by their judge advocate general, which I think is a very wise decision to have you with us.
We welcome our witnesses and thank them for their service. Thank them again. How many times members of this committee and other members of Congress have gone abroad and visited each of you in CENTCOM, and most particularly Afghanistan and Iraq.
We must all be mindful of the role of our witnesses in the operational chain of command and of their related responsibilities in the administration of military justice. Each witness this morning will use caution with regard to their comments, such as not to inadvertently influence in any way the ongoing criminal or administrative proceedings.
And, indeed, I'll add, the investigations. Many investigations instituted by the Department of Defense are now ongoing. Indeed, this morning we see the opening of the first trials, and opening in a manner in which the entire world public can see democracy in action.
As I previously stated, this mistreatment of prisoners represents an appalling and totally unacceptable breach of military regulations and conduct. Our committee, a co-equal branch of the United States Congress, co-equal branch of government, and our committee has a solemn responsibility to determine as best we can how this breakdown in military leadership and discipline occurred. And most importantly, what steps are being taken by the civilians in control and, indeed, those in the uniform, to see that it never, never happens again.
I firmly believe this prisoner mistreatment represents an extremely rare chapter in the otherwise proud and magnificent history of the United States military. It is counter to every human value that we as Americans have learned, beginning in our earliest days with our families, our schools, our churches.
WARNER: It is counter to what this nation stands for and it is counter to the principles that the men and women of the armed forces today and in years past have fought to protect wherever they are in the world in the cause of freedom.
There must be a full accountability for the abuse of Iraq detainees and important questions must be asked of the chain of command to understand what happened, how it happened, when it happened and how those in positions of responsibility either ordered, encouraged or authorized — or maybe looked the other way — such conduct.
Our witnesses today are uniquely qualified to answer many of these important questions, including: What policies and procedures were established for the treatment of prisoners and detainee interrogations? What was the chain of command at the prison? Were military police or military intelligence personnel in charge and at what times? When did you — I say that collectively and individually — realize the magnitude of these allegations, the seriousness of them, and indeed the uniqueness?
What measures did you take to inform the civilian structure, from the president to the Department of Defense, Department of State and others — that civilian structure that has the ultimate responsibility for the control of the United States military, which goes back to the very origins of this country?
What steps were taken to respond to earlier reports of mistreatment of prisoners received from the International Committee of the Red Cross and possibly other sources?
And how did the conduct of interrogations and detainee operations evolve from May 2003 until January 2004?
WARNER: I'm confident that you will, to the best of your ability, be responsive to these and other questions.
I'm proud of the manner in which the armed forces of the United States, represented by these extraordinarily accomplished officers before us, have promptly reacted to the allegations, undertaken an appropriate investigation, and begun disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the trials, in some instances, beginning today.
We are a nation of laws. We confront breaches of our laws openly and directly. And we must find the evidence to hold those who break the law and regulation accountable.
We must not forget our overall purpose in Iraq and indeed in Afghanistan. Success there in both areas is essential, not only to our nation and the people of Iraq, but to the entire world as we fight global terrorism.
We all have an important stake in learning the truth. We must not allow these acts of a few to tarnish the honor of the many dedicated men and women in uniform, 99.99 percent, who are valiantly upholding the values they were taught in the cause of freedom, and doing so at great personal risk and at great sacrifice.
Lastly, how this hearing originated is spelled out in a letter that I wrote to secretary of defense last week, May 13th, for which I thanked him for his participation and assistance in facilitating these hearings that we have had.
I indicated that our committee would pursue further hearings and involve a list of witnesses. And I named them all, you three among the witnesses.
WARNER: And then I'll recite this paragraph, "To date, in scheduling, the committee has tried to meet your requirements, and we hope to continue such cooperation in arranging the earliest possible date for appearances of these witnesses.
"Given that some witnesses may need to remain in Iraq of operational reasons, we are open to exploring the option of video teleconferences for some hearings."
And in the course of the last few days and working with the department on, I thought, several civilians in the department to come up today, somewhat unexpectantly my distinguished colleague Senator Levin and I were informed that you were in town, General Abizaid, and had been for several days and that the other witnesses were coming for consultations at the department. And in cooperation the secretary made you available here this morning. And that's plain and simple how it happened.
As to the conduct of this hearing, the buck stops right here on this desk, and I'm chairman. And I consult with my members, as my distinguished ranking member consults with his. And I'm very proud of the manner in which this committee has pursued its responsibilities under the Constitution. We're trying to search for the facts, put together a record, so that we here in Congress, and indeed the American public, can better understand these problems.
This story has been unfolding in many ways. First, a very brave enlisted man sought to bring to the attention of his superiors a problem which, frankly, in his guts he knew was wrong. And he's to be commended for that. Thereafter, the military very quickly took action, and the rest is history.
The press has been diligent. The victims have actually gone on to tell their story.
WARNER: The lawyers are trying to interpret it. And really the distressing thing is watching the families, families of the soldiers who are under the uniform code now being examined, families of other soldiers.
And I just felt it was imperative that at some point in time — and the Pentagon basically selected when that time would be, this morning — that you would face the American public and face the world and give your own personal accounts of how this situation happened and, most importantly, what we're going to do to see that it never happens again. That is the executive and the legislative branches working together.
We're proud of the democracy here in America. It's an open process. And we're going to show the world how we fairly, firmly and calmly deal with this situation.
Thank you.
Senator Levin?
LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning. I want to join you in thanking each one of them for their service to our nation.
And most importantly of all, I join you, Mr. Chairman, in asking our witnesses to pass along to the troops under their command the gratitude of every member of this committee and of our nation for the service of those troops.
The allegations of abuses of Iraqi detainees has shocked our country and shocked our justifiably proud armed forces and their families.
The committee's hearing this morning is part of our continuing efforts to investigate and find out the full extent of these abuses and how they could have happened. Insisting on accountability will help prevent future abuses and hopefully help restore the credibility of our nation within Iraq, the region and throughout the world.
LEVIN: The inquiry is not just about the behavior of a few soldiers at a detention facility. We, of course, must do whatever we can to ensure that the perpetrators of the abuses are held accountable. But also those who are responsible for encouraging, condoning or tolerating such behavior or who established or created an atmosphere or climate for such abusive behavior must also be held accountable.
The February 2004 report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, presents an overview of documented abuses that extend beyond the conduct of interrogations at one cell block in one detention facility. The report sets forth an extensive list of methods of ill treatment used, quote, "in a systematic way," close quote, by military intelligence at Abu Ghraib and a number of other facilities.
Nor are the abuses that are alleged apparently limited to detention facilities. Many of the alleged violations are reported to occur at the time of arrest.
This is particularly disturbing given the statement in the Red Cross report that, quote, "Certain military intelligence officers told the ICRC that in their estimate between 70 and 90 percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake."
In addition, according to their repot, the ICRC in May 2003 handed over to the U.S. Central Command in Doha a memorandum based on, quote, "over 200 allegations of ill treatment of prisoners of war during capture and interrogation," close quote.
I know that General Abizaid and General Sanchez will inform us today about when the Red Cross and other reports of abuse were brought to their attention and what actions were ordered to address those concerns.
LEVIN: In addition to reports that were made in the field, ICRC President Kellenberger stated that he briefed administration officials, including CPA Administrator Paul Bremer, Secretary Powell, National Security Adviser Rice and Pentagon officials, concerning allegations of abuse on a number of occasions, including in early and mid-2003 and January 2004.
And we'd be interested in hearing from our witnesses about what word, if any, was received from Washington or Ambassador Bremer as a result of those allegations of abuse being brought to the attention of administration officials.
Finally, I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your determination to carry out the oversight responsibility of this committee. Committees of jurisdiction have a obligation to understand these events, to deter future abuses and to help assure proper accountability.
Mr. Chairman, you are leading this committee in a responsible way to do just that, and this nation is in your debt for you carrying out your duty as you see it.
WARNER: Senator Levin, the committee is acting as a whole. Each member, most especially yourself, have been responsible for conducting ourselves, I think, in strict accordance with the institution of the Senate and in the best interests of the Constitution.
Gentleman, I'll ask you to rise.
In accordance to the rules of this committee, will you raise your right hand?
I solemnly swear the testimony that I'm about to give the Senate committee of the United States the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
ABIZAID: I do.
SANCHEZ: I do.
MILLER: I do.
General Abizaid?
ABIZAID: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ABIZAID: Senator Warner, Senator Levin and members of the committee, a few days ago, I had the honor to talk to the class of 2004 at West Point, young men and women who have dedicated themselves to service to the nation and who clearly understand that within the first year of their duties they will likely find themselves in combat, probably in the CENTCOM theater of operations.
I could have just as easy been talking to young cadets at the Air Force or Naval Academies or at other countless colleges or places where our young people are about to be commissioned as officers in our armed forces.
One of the most important messages I had for them is my deep, deep belief in the principle that officers of the United States military are responsible; that when in charge we must be in charge.
This is as true for the lowest second lieutenant in the chain of command as it is for me. Every officer is responsible for what his or her unit does or fails to do. I accept that responsibility for the United States Central Command.
I come before you as a senior regional commander to address the Abu Ghraib prison case and at the same time, I hope you'll allow me to discuss the conduct of the war not only in Iraq, but throughout the region.
As all of you understand, both General Sanchez and I, as members of the chain of command, have yet to examine all the facts about the incidents at Abu Ghraib; have made no judgment as to the guilt or innocence of any person associated with events there; nor have we precluded further action against others that additional testimony or evidence may indicate acted inappropriately or failed in their duties.
From evidence already gathered, we believe that systemic problems existed at the prison that may have contributed to events there.
ABIZAID: Other investigations are currently under way, and we will consider their findings carefully once they become available. We will follow the trail of evidence wherever it leads. We will continue to correct systemic problems. We will hold people accountable. And in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, we will take appropriate action.
On my way back to the States, I stopped and talked to many of the region's top military and political leaders to discuss Abu Ghraib and the situation in Iraq, to assess the damage that this incident has done to our reputation. They, like us, and like the many Iraqis who talked to me before I last left Iraq, were shocked, disgusted and disappointed at the images of abuse.
Yet all of them expressed confidence that our system could and would produce answers and hold people accountable. If we endanger our ability to see that justice is served — through failure to thoroughly investigate allegations, by inadvertently exerting inappropriate command influence, or through the inappropriate handling of evidence — we will do ourselves, the region and Iraqis in particular a great disservice.
As concerned as the good people of the region are about what happened at Abu Ghraib, they are more concerned about our willingness to stay the course in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are more worried that we'll lose our patience with the difficult tasks of stabilizing those places and we'll walk away and come home and bring up the drawbridges and defend Fortress America.
For some of the nations in the region our departure could be fatal. I reassured our friends that we are tough, that we cannot be defeated militarily and that we will stay the course.
We know that we must move quickly from occupation to partnership in Iraq.
ABIZAID: We know that we must help the Afghan government of President Karzai extend its influence throughout its own land. We must find and destroy Al Qaida and its ideological partners wherever we find them. And we must help the nations of the Middle East help themselves in fighting this desperate war against terror and extremism.
We have given much blood and treasure since 9/11, and we will give more.
Allowing moderation to succeed in a region where talented people seek prosperity and hope for their children is as important a victory as our struggles against the totalitarian regimes of the Second World War.
Our enemies are in a unique position, and they are a unique brand of ideological extremists whose vision of the world is best summed up by how the Taliban ran Afghanistan.
If they can outlast us in Afghanistan and undermine the legitimate government there, they'll once again fill up the seats at the soccer stadiums and force people to watch executions.
If in Iraq the culture of intimidation practiced by our enemies is allowed to win, the mass graves will fill again.
Our enemies kill without remorse, they challenge our will through the careful manipulation of propaganda and information, they seek safe havens in order to develop weapons of mass destruction that they will use against us when they are ready.
Their targets are not Kabul and Baghdad, but places like Madrid and London and New York.
They are a patient and despicable enemy that seeks to break our will, to terrorize us in such a manner as to cause us to leave the fight, to isolate us from our allies, to destroy those that seek a better future and direct the patient work required to build reliable infrastructure and sophisticated economic structures.
Unlike us, they will not hold themselves accountable for their outrages.
Our enemies believe they have scored a great victory in Madrid. They believed they changed a government and forced a valued ally off the battlefield.
They see before them elections in Iraq, elections in Afghanistan, and indeed elections here at home and elsewhere.
ABIZAID: They see us mired in scandal and preoccupied with failure.
We should not kid ourselves about the violent times ahead, yet we should also understand that, despite the images of Abu Ghraib and burning Humvees that constantly play on our media screens, we are winning the battle against extremism.
Our troops are confident. They win tactical battle after tactical battle. They work with Iraqis and Afghanis to build viable security forces, and one day these viable security forces will allow us to come home.
They know that the enemy is elusive and dangerous, and they know that they need to fight this war with balanced ferocity and compassion.
As we fight this most unconventional war of this new century, we must be patient and courageous. It will require a great amount of intelligence work. We must focus all of our national power and recognize that this war requires as much political, economic, diplomatic and national willpower to win as it does the courage to fight and to sacrifice with our young people in harm's way.
There are more people in the region who value peace over terrorism, who know that moderation brings prosperity and hope for their children. They also know that if they cannot stand alone, they certainly cannot expect that the United States of America will walk away from them.
Our gift to them has to be to give them a chance to win. Our great gift to ourselves will be to show a great and open demonstration that the rule of law applies in time of war; that despite the great demands of the day-to-day battles, we will fix what is broken and we will let justice be served.
No doubt, we have made mistakes in Abu Ghraib. We have suffered a setback.
ABIZAID: I accept responsibility for that setback. But the failures of a few will not keep the many courageous young men and women of ours from accomplishing their dangerous and important work to defend the nation abroad.
And I thank the committee.
WARNER: Thank you, General, for a very good statement.
General Sanchez?
SANCHEZ: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee and talk to you about events in Iraq, and specifically the events at Abu Ghraib.
Before I talk about these events, I'm proud to report that over 150,000 coalition military personnel are doing great work in Iraq under very, very difficult circumstances. They are fighting an insurgency, rebuilding and protecting infrastructure, and setting the conditions for the inevitable turnover to an interim government on the 30th of June.
Those soldiers, sailors, airman and Marines of America and the people who support them are stunned, disappointed and embarrassed by the events that transpired at Abu Ghraib prison. However, like me, these great servicemembers also understand that we must continue with our mission.
Regarding the events at Abu Ghraib, we must fully investigate and fix responsibility, as well as accountability. I am fully committed to thorough and impartial investigations that examine the role, commissions and omissions of the entire chain of command, and that includes me.
As the senior commander in Iraq, I accept responsibility for what happened at Abu Ghraib, and I accept as a solemn obligation the responsibility to ensure that it does not happen again.
We have already initiated courts-martial in seven cases, and there may very well be more prosecutions. The Army Criminal Investigative Division investigation is not final, and the investigation of military intelligence procedures by Major General Fay is also ongoing.
We may find that the evidence produced in these investigations not only leads to more courts-martial, but causes us to revisit actions previously taken to determine whether to initiate judicial or nonjudicial action in cases which may have been handled to date by adverse administrative action.
SANCHEZ: In this regard, I must be very circumspect in what I say. We must let our military justice process work. It is a process in which the American people can and should have confidence, and one in which I take great pride.
I cannot say anything that might compromise the fairness or integrity of the process or in any way suggest a result in a particular case. I have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and that includes ensuring that all persons receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, appropriate punishment.
This respect for the rule of law has been a guiding principle for my command. There is no doubt that the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions, apply to our operations in Iraq. This includes interrogations.
I have reinforced this point by way of orders and command policies. In September and October of 2003, and in May of 2004, I issued interrogation policies that reiterated the application of the Geneva Conventions and required that all interrogations be conducted in a lawful and humane manner, with command oversight.
In October 2003, I issued a memorandum for all coalition forces personnel that was entitled "Proper Treatment of Iraqi People During Combat Operations." I reissued this memorandum on the 16th of January after learning about the events that had taken place at Abu Ghraib.
On the 4th of March of 2004, I issued my policy memorandum number 18, entitled "Proper Conduct During Combat Operations." This document, which I also reissued in April, emphasized the need to treat all Iraqis with dignity and respect. This policy memorandum also contained a summary for distribution down to the individual soldier level that provided clear guidance and mandated training on the following points.
Follow the law of war and the rules of engagement.
Treat all persons with humanity, dignity and respect.
Use judgment and discretion in detaining civilians.
Respect private property.
And treat journalists with dignity and respect.
With regards to Abu Ghraib, as soon as I learned of the reported abuses, I ensured that a criminal investigation had been initiated and requested my superior appoint an investigating officer to conduct a separate administration investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 into this matter.
SANCHEZ: Within days of receiving the initial report, I directed suspension of key members of the chain of command of the unit responsible for detainee security at Abu Ghraib.
The criminal investigation, while still under way, resulted thus far in the decision to initiate court-martial proceedings against seven individuals. The administrative investigation that was conducted by Major General Taguba has caused me to change the way we conduct detention, internment and interrogation operations.
One significant change has been the addition to my staff of a general officer with responsibility for detention operations. As you know, Major General Geoffrey Miller was assigned this task and has taken numerous positive steps to eliminate the possibility that such abuse could occur in the future.
Well before I received the January 14th report and viewed the shocking photographs later on, I had directed steps be taken to improve the overall condition of detainees at Abu Ghraib.
Back in August 2003, I requested that subject matter experts conduct a comprehensive assessment of all detention operations in Iraq. This was the genesis for the report completed by Major General Ryder, the provost marshal general of the Army.
In September, a team headed by General Miller assessed our intelligence interrogation activities and human detention operations. We reviewed the recommendations with the expressed understanding, reinforced in conversations between General Miller and me, that they might have to be modified for use in Iraq where the Geneva Convention was fully applicable.
Plans for the new detainee camp at Abu Ghraib, which will now be called Camp Redemption, were begun in November of 2003 in order to relieve overcrowding of the facility. After a series of mortar attacks against the facility in September which killed and injured both Iraqi detainees and U.S. soldiers, I directed increased force protection measures be taken in order to protect coalition forces and detainees. The plans to upgrade the facilities for soldiers and detainees were also implemented.
And finally, the rate at which detainee case files were reviewed and recommended for release or continued internment was increased both in November of 2003 and again in February of 2004 in order to ensure that only those detainees who posed a threat to security were detained. Indeed, our February 2004 changes resulted in the review of over 100 cases per day.
The terrible events that occurred in the fall of 2003 have obviously highlighted additional problems that we have moved quickly to address.
SANCHEZ: While horrified at the abusive behavior that took place at Abu Ghraib, I believe that I've taken the proper steps to ensure that such behavior is not repeated.
I further believe that my actions have sent the correct message that such behavior is inconsistent with our values, our standards and our training.
I have faith in our military justice system to resolve the cases brought before it.
I would like to read the concluding paragraph of my memorandum to the command on proper conduct during combat operations. I believe it is an accurate summary of my standards and expectations.
"Respect for others, humane treatment of all persons, and adherence to the law of war and rules of engagement is a matter of discipline and values. It is what separates us from our enemies. I expect all leaders to reinforce this message."
In closing, the war in Iraq continues against a relentless enemy that is focused on preventing the Iraqi people from achieving their dream of freedom, prosperity and security. This awful episode at Abu Ghraib must not allow us to get distracted.
America's armed forces are performing magnificently, sacrificing every single day to defeat an enemy that is ruthless and elusive in his quest to terrorize Iraq and the world.
The honor and value systems of our armed forces are solid and the bedrock of what makes us the best in the world.
There has been no catastrophic failure, and America's armed forces will never compromise their honor.
America must not falter in this endeavor to defeat those who seek to destroy our democratic value systems.
In Iraq, the coalition military, including our 130,000 Americans, remain focused, and I guarantee you they will not fail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WARNER: Thank you, General. And that's a very comprehensive statement. And I would ask on behalf of the committee that the documents that you referred to you your testimony — could copies be provided to the committee?
SANCHEZ: We'll comply, Mr. Chairman.
WARNER: Thank you very much.
General Miller?
MILLER: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for affording me this opportunity to appear this morning. While I have no opening statement, I do stand with the statements of General Abizaid and General Sanchez.
Thank you.
WARNER: Thank you very much.
Colonel Warren, do you wish to add anything?
WARREN: Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement, but I would be happy to respond to any questions.
WARNER: Thank you very much.
We will follow our six-minute round. And I advise the committee that, in consultation with General Abizaid and the ranking member, there will be a brief closed session following the open session such that we can receive some classified material.
General Abizaid, what policies has the Central Command established for the conduct of interrogations in detainee operations? When were these policies established? What allegations of abuse are you aware of that could have occurred also in Afghanistan? Are the policies being uniformly applied and enforced throughout your AOR?
ABIZAID: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I believe the Army has come over and discussed with the committee, the total number of detainee abuse cases that have been investigated since I believe the beginning of the conflict in Afghanistan is around 75. And, of course, there are some death investigations as well.
We have homicide investigations that go back as far as December 2002 in Afghanistan that we absolutely have got to move on and understand what happened there.
ABIZAID: We're working with the Army Criminal Investigation Division to understand that. But I believe the committee has the statistics on abuse.
And abuse has happened. Abuse has happened in Afghanistan, it's happened in Iraq, it's happened at various places.
I think the question before us: Is there a systemic abuse problem with regard to interrogation that exists in the Central Command area of operations?
Yesterday — and I know the committee has not had a chance to review it yet — I did see the preliminary findings of a Department of the Army I.G. investigation that talked about problems in training, problems in organization, very specific changes that will need to be made in doctrine, et cetera.
And I specifically asked the I.G. of the Army, did he believe that there was a pattern of abuse of prisoners in the Central Command area of operation, and he looked at both Afghanistan and Iraq and he said no.
I sent my I.G. out in August of last year asking him the same question: Are we treating people with dignity and respect?
With regard to policies, it is...
WARNER: What findings did he report back when you sent him out to get all this?
ABIZAID: He came back and said that we were struggling with the number of prisoners, we were struggling with the facilities, and we were struggling to, in particular, deal with criminal detainees that needed to go into an Iraqi criminal detention system that still didn't exist.
WARNER: But he didn't discover any of the evidence that is now being revealed about these abuses?
ABIZAID: No, sir, he did not.
WARNER: All right, that's a direct answer.
Can you provide the committee, within the bounds of not violating UCMJ procedures and otherwise, your own personal observations as to what you believe happened from the breakdown of the orders that General Sanchez has clearly documented here this morning and where it happened?
ABIZAID: Sir, I think you know that Major General Fay is still conducting an investigation, and so I'm not quite ready to say where I think all the breakdown were.
But it's clear that there were some breakdown in procedures, in access, in standards of interrogation, and confusion between the roles of what the military intelligence people were doing versus the military police.
And there was also clearly criminal misconduct that took place. And the criminal misconduct is not the subject of any order or policy that I believe exists anywhere.
WARNER: There's been, for course, concern that the initial steps by the chain of command was directed at a group of enlisted people who are now subject to various forms of UCMJ accountability. Can you assure this committee that you will diligently pursue all evidence and, no matter how high up the chain or sideways or down the chain, all will be brought forward subject to the UCMJ?
ABIZAID: Sir, I assure the committee that we will do that.
WARNER: Fine.
ABIZAID: And I can also assure the committee that I've been in this business a long time, and when General Sanchez called me up and told me, I think, probably within 24 hours of the evidence being handed to his Criminal Investigation Division people in Baghdad, he followed it up very shortly with a decision to suspend the entire chain of command, which is a pretty strong action that doesn't just focus at a low level.
ABIZAID: He initiated investigations and he moved ahead in a way that I thought was commendable.
WARNER: Do you feel that the UCMJ procedures and other regulations impeded in any way your responsibility to keep the civilian control structure back in Washington advised?
ABIZAID: No, sir, it did not impede us. As always, we believe that we've got to do everything possible to protect the evidence that's available, to keep the investigatory information within investigatory channels, and that's what we tried to do.
WARNER: You tried to do that in a timely fashion?
ABIZAID: That's what we tried to do.
WARNER: Yes.
General Sanchez, on November 19th you directed that the commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade assume command of all units and operations in the prison of Abu Ghraib. Why did you put military intelligence in charge of the prison? In your view, did this new command arrangement improve intelligence and detainee operations? What objections did General Karpinski, commander, have concerning the change in command responsibilities?
SANCHEZ: Mr. Chairman, on the 19th of November, I issued a fragmentary order that placed all elements at Abu Ghraib under the tactical control of Colonel Pappas, the 205th M.I. commander.
The specific order stated that this was for forward operating base protection and for security of detainees.
SANCHEZ: The context of the order is that we had been receiving significant amounts of a direct and indirect fire. And during the conduct of one of my visits, I had found that force protection and the defensive planning of that FOB was seriously lacking and I needed to get a senior commander in charge of the defense of that forward operating base, and that was the purpose of the order.
The order did not intend to eliminate any of the responsibilities of the 800th Military Police commander. And that was a specific purpose for the tactical control. Tactical control placed the 320th under the 205th M.I. Brigade commander, and what that does, specifically, it gives the M.I. brigade commander authority to conduct local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish the mission at hand.
All of the other responsibilities for continuing to run the prison for logistics training, discipline and the conduct of prison operations remained with the 800th Brigade commander. And there was never a time when General Karpinski surfaced to me any objections to that tactical control order.
WARNER: General Abizaid, you — I properly advised this committee this morning that you're fighting a war. This responsibility occasioned by these abuses has taken a measure of your time, but you've continued and your troops have performed bravely.
The question I put to you — in listening, your professional and personal view: Is the scheduled change of sovereignty — limited sovereignty on July 1st consistent, in your judgment, and achievable given the security situation?
ABIZAID: Mr. Chairman, it is achievable, but it needs to emerge soon as to who is going to be in charge and what their names are and where they're going to be and what they're going to do.
WARNER: That's on the Iraqi side?
ABIZAID: That's correct.
WARNER: Clear on our side that we have a United States ambassador to replace (inaudible)?
ABIZAID: Sir, we're going to be there no matter what.
WARNER: To provide the security?
ABIZAID: That's correct.
WARNER: Thank you.
Senator Levin?
LEVIN: Thank you.
General Sanchez, your answer to Senator Warner about who was responsible for the M.P. units conducting detainee operations at that facility leaves me uncertain now, because General Taguba says that your order of November 19 effectively made the military intelligence officer, rather than the M.P. officer, responsible for the M.P. units conducting detainee operations. That's a quote. Do you disagree with General Taguba then on that point?
SANCHEZ: Senator, the purpose of the order was as described. It was to ensure that I had synchronized forward operating base defenses, and that was the purpose for the tactical control order that was issued to the military police unit at that installation.
LEVIN: Well, in addition to its purpose, though, General Taguba said that the military intelligence officer then became responsible for the M.P. units conducting the operations. Do you differ with that?
SANCHEZ: They were responsive to the military intelligence officer for the specific purpose of defending the forward operation base, Senator.
LEVIN: That did not, then, include conducting detainee interrogations.
SANCHEZ: That is exactly right, sir. It did not include that.
LEVIN: There's a difference there between you and General Taguba.
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.
LEVIN: General Abizaid, in May of 2003 the Red Cross sent to the coalition forces a memorandum based on over 200 allegations of ill treatment of prisoners during capture and interrogation at collecting points, battle group stations and temporary holding areas, according to the ICRC report, which I'm now reading.
LEVIN: It said here that the U.S. Central Command in Doha received this memorandum. And I'm wondering if, in fact, you remember receiving that memorandum and what action you took on it.
ABIZAID: There are some Red Cross reports, Senator, that we received. Which one are you talking about?
LEVIN: May 2003.
ABIZAID: I know that the May 2003 report was received at our headquarters, that's correct.
LEVIN: And what action do you remember taking?
ABIZAID: I was a deputy commander at the time. I know that we discussed the report. We sent it forward to the Combined Forces Land Component Command, General McKiernan, and we asked for his take on it.
LEVIN: Did you receive a report from him, do you remember?
ABIZAID: I do not believe we received a report in writing, and I do not recall having a lot to do with this particular report or paying much attention to it.
LEVIN: Perhaps you could then check your records and supply to the committee any documents relative to that also.
In early July, according to the Red Cross, the Red Cross sent to the coalition forces a working paper detailing approximately 50 allegations of ill treatment in the military intelligence section of Camp Cropper, and this, according to their report, set forth requiring — or using stress positions for three or four hours, physical hits, prolonged exposure to sun and a number of other allegations.
LEVIN: Can you tell us whether the early July ICRC report was received at headquarters?
ABIZAID: No. And we have a real problem with ICRC reports and the way that they're handled and the way that they move up and down the chain of command.
For example, the February report of '04, I first read in May.
LEVIN: Relative to the early July report...
ABIZAID: I won't make any excuses for it, Senator. I'll just say that we don't all see them. Sometimes it works at a lower level. Sometimes commanders at the lowest level get the report and they work on it confidentially. And I think what we've got to do is have a system that when there is something that comes to the attention at any level of command that it not be worked through at the lower level, but that it surfaces all the way up through the chain of command.
So we've got a problem there that's got to be fixed.
LEVIN: General Sanchez, is there a record of the ICRC working paper being received by you or at your level?
SANCHEZ: The July paper?
LEVIN: July...
SANCHEZ: Yes.
LEVIN: ... the working paper detailing 50 allegations of ill treatment?
SANCHEZ: Not that I'm aware of, Senator.
LEVIN: So there's no indication at your level at your headquarters that that document was ever received?
SANCHEZ: No, Senator, the working paper that I am aware of that made it to my headquarter was the November paper.
LEVIN: The Interrogation Rules of Engagement, so called — this is a document which was presented to this committee by General Alexander, saying that the rules of engagement that were in effect at the Combined Joint Task Force-7 in Iraq prior to 2003 are set forth on a piece of paper, which — are you familiar with it? — called Interrogation Rules of Engagement.
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, I have seen that.
LEVIN: And can you tell us what — if you've seen this before, did you approve this? Did you have legal advice? What is this document that General Alexander told us were the rules of enlargement that were in effect at the Combined Joint Task Force?
SANCHEZ: Sir, the first time I saw that paper was when it was shown in one of the prior hearings in this same forum. And I had no role in preparing it or approving it.
LEVIN: All right. So he was in error then relative to that? General Alexander then would have been in error if he said this was the document?
SANCHEZ: Right, sir. I have never seen that, and I had never approved it, and had no part in putting that together, sir.
LEVIN: I don't believe this committee has your October 12th policy statement. If I'm wrong, then fine. But can you present — would you provide that October 12th to the committee?
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.
LEVIN: And finally, the newspaper reported that 100 or so high- value detainees do not fall under your command, General Sanchez, but are the responsibility of General Dayton, who's commander of the Iraq Survey Group, who reports directly to General Abizaid. Is that accurate, as far as you know?
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, that is accurate. My M.P.s provide security at Camp Cropper.
LEVIN: Can you just tell us then why that was done that way, General Abizaid?
ABIZAID: Sir, that was done that way because the people at Camp Cropper happened to be those people that had theoretical information concerning weapons of mass destruction information, and also were the high-value detainees that we hope some day to turn over to a legitimate Iraqi government for trial.
LEVIN: But why should they be treated differently from other detainees, separated out that way?
ABIZAID: They were separated out that way to ensure that we understood — I guess I would call it the strategic environment, as opposed to the tactical environment, where we would get information at a lower level from lower-level detainees.
ABIZAID: It was established that way as a result of discussions that were taken place here in Washington regarding having a better and more efficient way to really understand what was going on with regard to weapons of mass destruction.
LEVIN: That was all then WMD-information-related, basically?
ABIZAID: It was sir, but it was also dealing with very senior levels of the government...
LEVIN: Thank you.
ABIZAID: ... of the former Iraqi government.
LEVIN: Thank you.
WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
I've just been informed that the Department of Defense has informed the committee that another disk of pictures has been located. And I'll soon advise the committee on the conditions under which — and timing — they can be viewed.
Senator McCain?
MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the witnesses, particularly Generals Miller and Abizaid and Sanchez, for their outstanding service to our nation under the most difficult circumstances. And I was pleased to hear that you were here on other business and were not have to be called back from the theater of operations.
And I thank you for all the time and effort you have devoted to trying to resolve this terrible issue. And we're very grateful for that and your appearance here today.
General Sanchez, according to a November 19th, 2003 message, as you responded to questions from Senator Warner and Senator Levin, you transferred full responsibility to General Pappas to assume full responsibility for Abu Ghraib and appointed the guard units to be under the tactical control that 205 Military Intelligence commander for security of detainees and forward operating base protection, I quote from your message. I think that's accurate.
MCCAIN: In his statement to General Taguba, Colonel Pappas said, and I quote, "Policies and procedures established by the joint operation detention center at Abu Ghraib relative to detainees operations were enacted as a specific result of a visit by Major General Geoffrey Miller, commander of Joint Task Force Gitmo."
He went on to say, quote, "The key findings of his visit were that the interrogators and analysts develop a set of rules and limitations to guide interrogation and provide dedicated M.P.s to support interrogation operations" — I repeat, "and provide dedicated M.P.s to support interrogation operations."
Now, General Sanchez, General Miller's report, as I understand it, had observations and recommendations. One of those recommendations was, and I quote from his recommendations, "It is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees."
Am I accurate so far, General Sanchez?
SANCHEZ: Yes, Senator.
MCCAIN: General Miller?
MILLER: Yes, sir, you are.
MCCAIN: General Miller, do you believe that your instructions may have been misinterpreted?
MILLER: Senator, I do not.
On our visit to the JTF to be able to give an assessment of the intelligence function in the three major areas — intelligence fusion, the interrogation process and in humane detention — the team of 19 experts laid out those standards that would allow for humane detention, interrogation in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and then recommended procedures by which intelligence could be fused more rapidly to provide actionable intelligence for units and for the JTF itself.
MCCAIN: Well, thank you.
But it seems to me that this order that I just quoted, which turned over certain M.P. duties to the control of Colonel Pappas, then certain things happened. And according to General Taguba's report, soldiers were questioned that were involved in this.
MCCAIN: Soldier number one, question, "Have you ever been directed by the M.I., military intelligence, personnel or any government agency to soften up a prisoner prior to interrogation?" Answer, "Yes. Sometimes they would ask me to show a prisoner, quote, 'special attention.'"
Soldier number two, "Have you ever been told by M.I. personnel to work over a prisoner?" "Yes. M.I. told us to rough them up to get answers from the prisoners." "Why didn't you report the abuse?" "Because I assumed that if we were doing anything wrong or out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also, the wing belonged to military intelligence and it appeared military intelligence personnel approved of the abuse."
Soldier number three, question, "What can you tell us about the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib?" "Yes, the M.I. staffs, to my understanding, have given compliments to us on the way we were handling the M.I. holds. For example, meaning statements like, 'Good job, they're breaking down real fast.' Quote, 'They answer every question, now keep it up,' unquote. 'They're giving out good information.'"
Soldier number four, "Have you ever heard M.I. insinuate to guards to abuse inmates of any type of manner?" "Yes." "What was said?" Answer, quote, "They said, 'Loosen this guy up for us, make sure he has a bad night, make sure he gets the treatment.'"
You see my point, Major General Miller?
At least according to General Taguba's report, there were at least a number of guards — I mean, guards, M.P.s, who were under the impression or stated that they were under the impression that they were under specific directions of military intelligence personnel to, quote, "rough up, soften up, give them a bad night," et cetera.
MCCAIN: How do we respond to that, General Miller?
MILLER: Sir, in the recommendations that we made...
MCCAIN: Could I go back to my first question? This goes back to my first question. Does this lead you to believe that your orders were misinterpreted?
MILLER: No, sir. The leadership that received the recommendations throughout the JTF had a clear understanding of the recommendations that we made in those three areas of intelligence fusion, interrogation and humane detention that laid out those requirements, laid the basis that they must be in concert with the Geneva Convention, and gave recommendations from our experience about how those three functions could be done successfully.
MCCAIN: There must have been a breakdown somewhere.
MILLER: Sir, in my estimation, it's a breakdown in leadership on how that the follow-on actions may have occurred, but I was not present at that time, so it would be difficult for me to give...
MCCAIN: General Sanchez — my time has expired.
WARNER: Go ahead.
MCCAIN: General Sanchez, please?
SANCHEZ: Senator, I wanted to make one clarification: that General Miller did not issue any orders, and he has not issued any orders until he arrived as the deputy commanding general for detainee operations. Those orders were my orders, sir.
MCCAIN: I guess my question was better directed to you. Were those orders misinterpreted?
SANCHEZ: Sir, I do not believe those orders were misinterpreted. The procedures that General Miller and I had discussed, that he had recommended, were very detailed. And it very clearly stated that M.P.s were involved in passive enabling of those operations and had no involvement in the conduct of interrogations. Those were the orders in the SOPs that remained after General Miller's visit.
MCCAIN: Thank the witnesses.
My time has expired. Thank you very much.
WARNER: Senator Kennedy?
KENNEDY: Thank you very much, General. And I echo the sense that all of us feel of the great respect we all have for you and the troops that you're commanding.
We've lost 23 very brave soldiers in my state of Massachusetts and we're all very mindful of the complexities, the difficulties that the uniformed service personnel are facing over there. So we thank you so much for your leadership and your careers and public service in serving our country.
I was, just quickly — General Sanchez, as an old M.P. myself, I'm surprised that you take that the military intelligence are better in force protection — in protecting the forces than the M.P.s. But we'll leave that for another time.
When we had the secretary of defense here, General Abizaid, last week, he denied that there was any failure to take any of these reports seriously.
"The military, not the media, discovered these abuses," he said. And Specialist Joseph Darby reported the acts of abuse in Abu Ghraib prison in mid-January. And, according to Secretary Rumsfeld, by the next day investigations were authorized.
Yet now we learn, both from the front page of the New York Times today and the front page of the Wall Street Journal today, that the International Committee on the Red Cross observed the abuses in the prison during the two unannounced inspections in October 2003, and they complained in a strongly-worded written report of November 6.
This report was reviewed by senior military officials in Iraq, including two advisers to General Sanchez, according to this report.
KENNEDY: So it appears that the military's first reaction was to restrict future Red Cross visits to the Abu Ghraib. That's the story in here: After the Red Cross had provided two critical reports, the reaction of the military dealing with the prison then was to restrict. They said, "You have to give us notice." And all of us understand what that means: If you're going to give notice prior to the inspections, it obviously compromises the inspections.
So according to those news reports, nothing was done in the prison for two months. And the military previously acknowledged that the worst abuses continued into December 2003.
So we have the secretary of defense saying one thing and we're learning from two newspapers another story. And that's why I think we are trying to find out what exactly, who was in charge, and who bears the responsibility, because these are completely conflicting stories within a period of just a few weeks here before this committee.
I don't know whether you have any reaction to those stories, whether you had a chance to see those this morning. I want to move on.
Quickly, I suppose it's fair to say who in Iraq or in CENTCOM is responsible for receiving and responding to the reports of violations of international law or conventions by U.S. military personnel.
SANCHEZ: I am responsible. If someone brings it to my attention, I am responsible. And I will not turn my back on any report that I receive.
KENNEDY: Well, you obviously didn't get these reports.
SANCHEZ: No, I didn't.
KENNEDY: Well, I'm asking who would have gotten these reports? Who would have received this report in the chain of command, General?
SANCHEZ: Senator, the November report was received by the brigade commander. And then the — as I found out now, the CJTF staff assisted her in responding to that report.
KENNEDY: Well, do they get — that brigade commander receive all of the reports or it's just — who institutionally receives, within your organization, any of the — like for the Red Cross violations that come on in? Who's in charge on that?
SANCHEZ: When the February '04 report came in, that's when I found out that the November working papers had been issued to the brigade commander. At that point, I immediately changed the procedure and required that those reports come to me as a senior commander in the country.
KENNEDY: But there were...
SANCHEZ: That is the procedure now.
KENNEDY: But there was no central receiving officer charged prior to what you've just established?
SANCHEZ: Prior to that, Senator, those all would come to the staff judge advocate's office. That was the repository. And he was the point of contact in terms of commander. It would come in at the lowest level.
KENNEDY: At the staff JAG — JAG office?
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, that is correct.
ABIZAID (?): If I may, sir, this system is broken. We've got a...
KENNEDY: Let me move on to General Miller.
After your assessment of the detention and interrogation in Iraq, you stated that it was essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for the successful exploitation of the internees.
And as you know, General Taguba strongly disapproved the recommendation, and he has stated that setting of the conditions for the detainees' successful exploitation through interrogation is fundamentally inconsistent with Army regulations. It undermines the goals of running a safe and secure detention facility. That's what he testified here for this committee.
So given the New York Times that reported yesterday that Colonel Pappas — Thomas Pappas, who's the military intelligence brigade commander at Abu Ghraib — told General Taguba that there was no safeguards to ensure the M.P.s at Abu Ghraib behaved properly in setting conditions for the detainees. "There'd be no way for us to actually monitor whether that happened," Colonel Pappas said. "We have no formal system in place to do that."
KENNEDY: General Taguba also found the M.P.s hadn't been trained on the Geneva Conventions.
Wasn't this a catastrophic failure of leadership? I mean, how would you expect an average soldier in the Army to understand the term "successful exploitation" isn't simply a euphemism for "anything goes"? And do you take responsibility for that failure?
MILLER: Thank you, Senator.
The Taguba report was very thorough, but I would like to clarify on this one point. The recommendation that my team made in the September time frame was that the military police help set the conditions for successful interrogation as we had learned of their success in Guantanamo.
The recommendation was that they conduct passive intelligence gathering during this process. And by that that meant to observe the detainees, to see how their behavior was, to see who they would speak with and then to report that to the interrogators so the interrogators could better understand the attitude with human dynamic of the detainee as he would come into the interrogation booth.
We also recommended that the military police, for security reasons, would accompany the detainee from the cell block, or the area where they were held, up to the interrogation booth because they are security risks. Then the M.P. would wait somewhere else, and then accompany the detainee back.
Our recommendations were that the M.P.s did not actively participate in any form of the interrogation itself.
And that was explained in detail to the chain of command and giving them that for their opportunity. And the SOP that laid that out was provided to them. It's about 200 pages long. It goes into great detail about how this system works, because, as it says in the SOP, the M.P.s are not trained intelligence officers, should not initiate questioning or anything like that. They were just to be observers of that process.
And so that was the active support for the interrogation process that was recommended.
And so, Senator, I will tell you, with my utmost — I believe that the recommendations that we made, had they been implemented, would have not only increased the intelligence value of what was being done, but help to ensure that humane detention was accomplished throughout every facility.
WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Roberts?
Before responding, General Sanchez, you made four references to the brigade commander. Now that would be General Karpinski?
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, that is correct.
ROBERTS: All right. I want the record to reflect that.
ABIZAID: Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I would just like to caution the committee. We still do not know what we don't know.
WARNER: That's very clear. And we recognize that. And it's been a struggle throughout this whole thing to get a full understanding. And that's why we've got to entrust credibility to what the Department of Defense and the Army, particularly, are doing now with a series of investigations. And we fully appreciate that.
ABIZAID: And I think that Major General Fay's report will go a long ways to make us understand this dynamic between M.P.s and M.I. in particular.
WARNER: And I share that.
ABIZAID: (OFF-MIKE) Senator McCain's questions.
WARNER: Thank you.
Senator Roberts?
ROBERTS: General Abizaid, you realize that your statement is contrary to the United States Senate where we always know what we don't know.
(LAUGHTER)
Let me say that I want to thank Senator McCain for his comments, because I think he spoke for the whole committee, in reference to the contribution that you are making to our country and your service to our country, and I would like to associate myself with his remarks.
ROBERTS: I'm going to try to get my fast questions in to General Miller.
Well, first let me ask of General Sanchez, no soldier would be justified in interpreting an order in such a way as to violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice; is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Sir, I would state absolutely.
ROBERTS: So even if a soldier did misinterpret General Miller's recommendation, even though I doubt if they had it, to carry out these acts, that would not be an excuse, would it?
SANCHEZ: Sir, that is correct. That is a basic instinct we built into the soldiers.
ROBERTS: General Miller, would the abuse evidenced by the photos be permitted or condoned under any practices or policies that were recommended in your report?
MILLER: Senator, they absolutely would not be.
ROBERTS: Would the abuse evidenced in the photos be permitted or condoned in any of the practices or policies at Gitmo?
MILLER: Senator, they would not.
ROBERTS: Do you have any problem with General Ryder, who allegedly said there should be a firewall between the M.P.s and military intelligence, given your rationale as to why they should work together if we have the leadership and the training and the discipline that you have indicated that we now have?
MILLER: Sir, our doctrinal publications say that there should be cooperation between the military police and the intelligence function in a detention facility.
But it does say there should not any active participation by the military police force in any interrogations.
ROBERTS: I have a staffer that works on the Intelligence Committee for me; I have the privilege of being chairman. He has been down at Gitmo in a reserve capacity. He indicates that you made a remarkable turnaround down at Gitmo. Many senators have gone down; it only takes a day. I encourage every senator here to do that. And I credit you for improving a very difficult kind of situation.
In Iraq, it's my understanding that there are three prisons, five battalions, four of the five are Reserves. Is that correct?
MILLER: Senator, in the organization that I now lead, as the deputy commander general for detainee operations, that is a correct statement.
ROBERTS: In the estimate today, after the incident at Abu Ghraib, how would you determine the leadership today in regards to discipline and training and leadership of those personnel that you command as of right now?
MILLER: Sir, in the first 30 days of my opportunity to work in this capacity, I was able to visit every facility and talk to virtually every leader and soldier who are involved in this. I'll tell you that there's strong, positive, dynamic leadership throughout this chain of command.
ROBERTS: So you've seen a hell of a change?
MILLER: Sir, we have seen soldiers and leaders who know what standards are and execute them seven days a week, 24 hours a day.
ROBERTS: At Gitmo, you had one M.P. per two prisoners. In Iraq, you have one M.P. per 8.5 prisoners. Is that correct?
MILLER: Sir, those are approximately correct numbers.
ROBERTS: OK, but you've indicated at 50 percent of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib will be released. You have 3,800 prisoners now. That will bring it down to 1,500. What's happening to the 1,500? I understand that 74 are being tried by the central court of Iraq. Will all 1,500 be tried?
MILLER: Sir, those approximately 1,500 security internees have been interned. That means that we have great — we have strong evidence that they have committed attacks on the coalition. And they will most likely be referred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for trial by the Iraqi system for those.
There are a number of those, approximately 600 to 700, who are so dangerous that should they be released back into Iraqi society that they would put that society at risk, with a higher probability of attack on their fellow citizens.
ROBERTS: So they're the worst of the worst.
MILLER: Sir, those are the worst of the worst.
ROBERTS: If the Red Cross investigated today, what would they find?
MILLER: Sir, the Red Cross is, as a matter of fact, investigating today. They are at Camp Buka, which is one of our theater facilities down by Umm Qasr on the southern border. They have found that we are making an enormous effort to improve conditions every day, that we take their findings seriously and that we have addressed them.
General Sanchez made a change when I arrived in the theater and put the ICRC responsibility directly on me. And so all reports come to me, and I move them to General Sanchez and the command leadership as rapidly as possible.
ROBERTS: So until we get the report by General Fay to assess responsibility and accountability, you think there's been a big change in regards to leadership and training and discipline, which all are directed at interrogation to provide better intelligence to save Iraqi lives and American lives. Is that correct?
MILLER: Yes, sir, that's absolutely correct.
ROBERTS: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WARNER: Senator Byrd?
BYRD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid and General Sanchez, this travesty of justice occurred on your watch. The Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal has dealt a body blow to the heroic efforts of scores of American military troops and civilian workers in Iraq to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. I do not know if that damage can ever be fully repaired.
Certainly a lot depends on what else might emerge about this scandal and on what you and the civilian leadership at the Pentagon — at the Pentagon — do to set things right.
BYRD: General Sanchez, you told Senator Levin that you never saw the rules of engagement presented to this committee last week. If you do not see or set the so called rules of engagement for the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, who does? Who does set them?
SANCHEZ: Senator, what I had stated is that I had not seen the specific slide that was referred to. I was the one that approved the interrogation rules of engagement on the 12th of September and again in the October time frame, sir.
BYRD: Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operation?
SANCHEZ: Senator, those rules were forwarded to Central Command in the September time frame. And based on the inputs from Central Command, resulted the October memorandum.
BYRD: I'll ask the question again. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations?
SANCHEZ: Sir, I do not know. As far as I know, there is no requirement for the civilian leadership to approve those rules of engagement.
ABIZAID: You know, Senator, I would say we're all responsible for making sure what happens in our organization happens right. Things don't have to go all the way to the top to be approved. We know what's right and we know what's wrong.
BYRD: But the committee needs to know if you can answer this question. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations? If so, who?
ABIZAID: My answer is no, it's our responsibility.
BYRD: Then you're saying that nobody in the Pentagon approves these rules?
ABIZAID: No, I'm not saying that, sir.
BYRD: Then what are you saying?
ABIZAID: I am saying that the rules of engagement for interrogators are a product of Army doctrine, of Army training, of practices in the field, and of commanders doing their job out there.
BYRD: General Abizaid, if someone at the Pentagon is required to approve these rules of engagement surely you know.
ABIZAID: If I knew, Senator, I would tell you. I would not forward any rules of engagement to anybody. Nobody's asked me for any, and I wouldn't have forwarded it to them.
BYRD: So you're indeed saying that nobody in the Pentagon approved these rules?
ABIZAID: I don't know that I'm saying whether they reviewed them or not. I am saying that I have not personally forwarded anything to the Pentagon for their approval.
BYRD: Did the secretary of defense has to approve these rules, to your knowledge?
ABIZAID: Sir, I (inaudible) said. In the Central Command, I have not forwarded anything to the Pentagon for approval with regard to rules of engagement.
BYRD: And I'm not asking you what you have forwarded to the Pentagon. To your knowledge, did the secretary of defense have to approve these or did he approve these rules of engagement, to your knowledge — the secretary of defense?
MILLER: Senator, if I might — I was the legal adviser for the command and participated in the drafting of the counter-resistance and interrogation policy.
There is no requirement that the Department of Defense review or approve the methods that we used. As Generals Abizaid and Sanchez has said, they're operating in a combat environment. The commanders have the authority to approve...
BYRD: All right, if there's no requirement, to your knowledge, did the secretary of defense approve these rules of engagement?
MILLER: Sir, to my knowledge, no.
BYRD: General Sanchez, as Senator Kennedy stated, the New York Times reported this morning — and here it is right here. The headline says, "Officers Says Army Tried to Curb Red Cross Visits to Prison in Iraq." Is that allegation accurate?
SANCHEZ: Sir, I never approved any policy or procedure or requirement to do that.
BYRD: Let's see what this says. Two announced inspections in Iraq — the International Committee of the Red Cross observed abuses in one cell block on two announced inspections in October, and complained in writing. On November the 6th, the military responded that inspectors should make appointments before visiting the cell block.
BYRD: Well, we know what that means.
General Abizaid, the Red Cross has alleged a pattern of abuse at detention centers in Iraq. With all due respect, how can you explain the culture of abuse that was allowed to develop in a prison system under your ultimate command?
ABIZAID: I don't believe that a culture of abuse existed in my command. And I don't believe that, based on what my I.G. told me and what the Department of the Army I.G. told me. I believe that we have isolated incidents that have taken place.
I am aware that the International Red Cross has its view on things. A lot of its view is based upon what happens at the point of detention, where soldiers fighting for their lives detain people, which is a very brutal and bloody event.
BYRD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
WARNER: Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Allard?
ABIZAID: Mr. Chairman, maybe I — if I may...
WARNER: Feel free, General, when you wish to add some information.
ABIZAID: Policies do flow from the top of the Defense Department and I don't want to give any impression that they do not. But standard operating procedures are our business, and we work them.
BYRD: These are not standing operating procedures we're talking about, I hope.
WARNER: Fine.
Senator Allard?
ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that I think the real travesty of justice is on the other side, where we see women and children used as shields; where we see a fight being carried on in mosques by our adversaries and other religious structures; where I see that conflict being carried in schools; and where our adversaries don't care about innocent lives, and they'll cheat and lie and do anything.
ALLARD: And I think that we have to understand the challenges that our men and women facing in Iraq. And I think that it's a very, very difficult situation.
Now, that doesn't justify, I think, what we've seen by a few individuals here in this prison. And I want to fully understand how it is that kind of incident would happen in the prison.
I think we all have to understand, I think, General Abizaid, that you have recognized that there is a problem and that we're in the process of correcting that problem.
Major General Miller, of the list of reports that came out, yours was the first report. You looked at Guantanamo, and then you went on ahead and briefed, I think, the command in Iraq as to what you learned in Guantanamo. Is that correct?
MILLER: Senator, when I briefed the command of CJTF-7, it was on the findings and recommendations that the team that I brought found of our assessments of the operations within CJTF-7 in Iraq.
ALLARD: Did you share with them some of the lessons learned and what not in Guantanamo and explain to them what to watch out for?
MILLER: Yes, sir.
We used our SOPs that we had developed for humane detention, interrogation and intelligence fusion, to be able to use that as a starting point where they could go about improving their capability.
ALLARD: And so when you did your briefing, how far down did that information go? Did it go to those interrogators, or were you relying on individuals further down in the command to pass on your words?
MILLER: Sir, the recommendations that I made from the assessments were given to the senior leadership of the joint task force for them to make decisions upon their applicability and then to, if they chose, make additional modifications to their procedures to go about doing that.
In no case did we — did the team have the opportunity or ask to brief down at the lowest level. It was at the senior leadership level, at the commander and the senior staff officer level.
ALLARD: Now, those lessons learned — can anybody on this panel explain to me what happened to that information that was shared by Major General Miller to a higher command? How was that passed down?
SANCHEZ: Yes, Senator.
What we did after I received the recommendations of General Miller is I then forwarded those to my staff and the commander of the detention center for execution — correction, for modification in accordance with the Geneva Convention, since we knew that there was a difference in climates between the two different operations.
And then we set about and...
ALLARD: By that "difference in climate," you're saying that in Guantanamo it wasn't as pertinent as to actually what was happening in the field of battle, but what was happening in Iraq was very pertinent, was happening on the day-to-day basis in the field of battle — and that information was crucial to the survival of Americans. Is that...
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, that is exactly right. We were, at that point in time working very, very hard to get intel fusion at a higher level that could allow us to target precisely the enemy forces.
And we had to very rapidly take those recommendations and modify them to the theater, modify them to ensure that they were in accordance with the Geneva Convention, get the lessons that had been learned before in interrogation and detention operations and be able to adjust our own procedures and fix the procedures that we had in- country.
ALLARD: Now, General Abizaid and General Sanchez, I'd like for you to describe the checks and balances or the command-wide reporting and supervision that was in place during 2003 when the subject prisoner abuses occurred.
General Taguba's report clearly shows abuses reported as early as May 2003 in Iraq, as well as major accountability leadership and basic discipline breakdowns through the 800th Military Police Brigade.
And, I guess, the bottom line, did Brigadier General Karpinski, the 800th M.P. Brigade commander, keep you informed as to the deteriorating conditions in her command?
ABIZAID: I did not talk to the commander of the 800th M.P. Brigade.
ALLARD: General Sanchez?
SANCHEZ: Sir, as far as the deteriorating conditions of her command, part of our basic understanding in the July-August time frame was that we had a detainee situation that had not been faced by our Army in over 50 years.
That was the reason why I had requested the Ryder team to come in to assist us in establishing those operations, so that they would be efficient, effective and treating people with dignity and respect. That is why I supported the Miller team coming into the country. And we were providing the resources that were necessary in order for us to stand up the capabilities of the 800th to be able to function effectively.
ALLARD: And the Ryder report, that was the first report in trying to deal with any hint of impropriety that was happening at the prison, is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Senator, there were investigations that had been conducted as a result of allegations of abuse that were out in the command, not at the detention centers at that point.
As we have stated before, there were allegations that at the point of contact, where the soldiers are fighting every single day, there were allegations from the ICRC that prisoners were being treated rough. And those were the allegations that were being investigated at that point in time.
As far as detention center abuses, at that point I did not have knowledge of that.
But I would like to make sure that the committee understands, we did have detention center problems. They were overcrowded. We didn't have the M.P.s in the right place. We were moving into facilities that had been destroyed or damaged by the war. We had an intelligence problem, in that the tactical units were not getting feedback from the detainees that moved into the detention centers.
And from Ambassador Bremer's point of view, he had a problem in that we weren't releasing detainees back into the population quickly enough, and he wanted us to come up with a system that would make that more efficient.
So let's be clear that we understood that there were problems in the detainee system linked to the intelligence system, linked to the political system that had to be addressed, and we were working on them.
But I would also like to remind you that these images are not the kind of thing that we thought was happening out there that anyone in the chain of command would have condoned or allowed to be practiced.
MILLER: Sir, if I may...
ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
MILLER: ... if I may just one — because I think it's an important clarifying point.
During the assistance visit that my team made in the August- September time frame, we were also charged with the responsibility of looking for humane detention throughout, at the CJTF Level 7 — 7 level detention facilities.
And during that assessment, in one of the facilities, the team found that it was being operated in an unsatisfactory manner. I stopped the assessment. I went to General Sanchez and made this report. He directed that there be corrective action made within 48 hours in this facility. That action was immediately started. And it was continuing on as the assessment team that I led departed theater.
And so there were reports — and I will tell you, there was very aggressive action taken by the chain of command to go about correcting those shortfalls.
ALLARD: Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
WARNER: Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed?
REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Warren, is it accurate to say that all the prisoners in Abu Ghraib were entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention, that they were either enemy prisoners of war or protected persons? Is that correct?
WARREN: Sir, that's right. They were protected persons either under the third or fourth Geneva Convention.
REED: Thank you.
Under the Geneva Convention Article 31, "no physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against any protected persons, in particular to obtain information about them or from third parties." Is that correct?
WARREN: Sir, you're quoting from Article 31 of the fourth convention. That is an accurate recitation of what the article says. I would cite you to Pictet's commentary on the article for elaboration...
REED: Well, thank you, but we'll go into the elaboration.
WARREN: Yes, sir. It should not be taken out of context.
REED: But that is the operative rule.
WARREN: That is a literal generalization.
REED: Let's go back to the rules of engagement here. Sleep management, 72 hours; sensory deprivation, 72 hours, would you consider that to be physical or moral coercion?
WARREN: Sir, not prohibited coercion under Article 31 for security internees in a...
REED: I'm talking about in particular to obtain information about them or from third parties.
WARREN: No, sir, I would not.
REED: So these are not methods to use for interrogation.
WARREN: Sir, the list on the right-hand side of the...
REED: Can you answer the question, Colonel?
WARREN: Sir, that does not require a yes-or-no answer. I have to elaborate upon it.
REED: Well, Colonel, my time is six minutes. So let me just move on.
WARREN: Yes, sir.
REED: You just said that these are coercive means.
WARREN: No, sir, I did not. What I said is...
REED: For a protected person, to obtain information.
WARREN: No, sir. What I said was that those that are on the right are a list on a slide which was produced at a low level, which was not representative of our counter-resistance and interrogation policy.
REED: Excuse me, Colonel, I'm asking you a question, not how it was evolved, but if 72 hours with a bag over your head to obtain information is contrary to Article 31 of the Geneva Convention; correct?
WARREN: That would be yes, sir.
REED: Thank you.
General Sanchez, today's USA Today, sir, reported that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation, intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise and inducing fear as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison.
REED: Is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Sir, that may be correct that it's in a news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be used within CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.
REED: Excuse me. Because I want to get back to this.
It may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a prisoner. Is that your answer?
SANCHEZ: No, sir, that's not what I said. I said it may be correct...
REED: Well, I didn't hear; that's why I want...
SANCHEZ: ... that it's printed in an article, but I have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq.
REED: What level of command produced this slide?
SANCHEZ: Sir, my understanding is that that was produced at the company commander level.
REED: How could the company commander evolve such a specific list? How could the company commander then turn around and said some of these things would require your permission without any interaction between your command? It seems to me just difficult to understand.
SANCHEZ: Sir, it's difficult for me to understand it. You have to ask the commander.
REED: Now, this is the company commander that you relieved and gave him a letter of admonition.
SANCHEZ: No, sir.
REED: No. OK.
General Miller, at Guantanamo, it's been reported that you developed a 72-point matrix for stress and duress, lays out types of coercion, escalating levels. They include harsher heat or cold, withholding food, hooding for days at a time, naked isolation and cold, dark cells. Is that correct?
MILLER: Sir, that is categorically incorrect.
REED: That never happened.
MILLER: That is categorically incorrect.
REED: OK.
When you were dispatched by Secretary Cambone and General Boykin to go to Iraq, did they give you any specific instructions about increasing the aggressiveness of interrogations?
MILLER: Sir, I was tasked to go to assist — conduct assistance visit by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MILLER: They tasked Southern Command, who then tasked JTF Guantanamo to put the team together.
REED: Did you have conversations with General Boykin and Secretary Cambone prior to your departure about your trip?
MILLER: Sir, I did not.
REED: You did not. Did you have any discussions after your visit, after your return?
MILLER: Sir, I submitted the report up to SOUTHCOM. I had no direct discussions with Secretary Cambone or General Boykin.
REED: Well, Secretary Cambone testified that General Boykin briefed him on your discussions. And he led the implication that you and General Boykin — have you spoken to General Boykin about any of these issues?
MILLER: No, sir. The report was provided up and it may — and this is my speculation because I do not know — it may have gone to General Boykin. But he and I have not had conversations about personal conversations about this inspection visit.
REED: Your team, when they went down and briefed at the — how low a level did you brief and talk to people in that prison?
MILLER: Sir, the team went at several different levels. They started at the CJTF level...
REED: How far did they go in the prison?
MILLER: They went down to the battalion commander level at the military police function and to the company commander level at the military intelligence function.
REED: And that might be the level where this document was developed?
MILLER: Sir, I do not know at what level that document was developed at.
REED: Did your team specifically brief that these techniques, which you deny being placed in Guantanamo, could not be used? Did they any way suggest that methods could be used in that prison that are contrary to Geneva Conventions?
MILLER: Sir, no methods contrary to the Geneva Convention were presented at any time by the assistance team that I took to CJTF-7.
MILLER: And there is no — as you brought up again, sir — there is no status, or there is no program, JTF-Guantanamo, that has any of those techniques. That are...
REED: Well...
MILLER: ... that are prohibited by the Geneva Convention.
REED: One of the problems that we have, General, is that we have not yet, after repeated requests, received the documentation about the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, which is another lack of cooperation in this investigation.
My time's expired. Will we have a second round, Mr. Chairman?
WARNER: It's important that we conclude today's round with a closed session in which members will be given an opportunity to have questions.
Senator Sessions?
SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank all of you for your service in a difficult and dangerous area of the world. You're serving your country with distinction.
General Abizaid, I appreciate your leadership and your comments earlier today.
We have made progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. We've had Al Qaida on the run. And we've made — we've avoided another attack on this country, for which we can be grateful.
I think you're correct to suggest that sometimes, in this city, people get preoccupied with failure and error rather than seeing the progress that's occurred.
And I am troubled by this suggestion that the interrogation rules are some, sort of, smoking gun of illegality and impropriety.
You've been asked about — what about sleep adjustment or sleep management for 72 hours? Those — as I read this document, this is a restrictive document that said anything — that such an action must be, have the direct approval of the commanding general.
SESSIONS: Is that the way you understand it, General Sanchez?
SANCHEZ: Sir, that's the way I read that document also, sir.
SESSIONS: And was it you or the commanding general, or who was the commanding general referred to?
SANCHEZ: That referred to the commanding general CJTF-7. That's me, sir.
SESSIONS: So, the system was set up to restrict these kind of activities. They could never be done even though, as Colonel Warren, the JAG officer said, could be acceptable under — some of them at least can be acceptable under the Geneva Conventions. They had to make a written report and request the use before any of those could be used.
SANCHEZ: That is exactly right, sir.
SESSIONS: And were any of these ever approved by you?
SANCHEZ: Sir, the only approvals that I ever had at my desk was for continued segregation beyond 30 days. And there were 25 of those who were approved. I never saw any other method come to my level requesting approval.
SESSIONS: So the only request under this category of what some refer to as harsher treatment were the isolation requests, which are done in American prisons every day. And these isolation requests were, in fact, submitted to you in writing. And do you or your staff make an evaluation before you approved them?
SANCHEZ: Yes, sir, those came forward. My staff — both the intel officer and my staff judge advocate evaluated those. And then my staff judge advocate brought them in to me, and I personally approved it.
SESSIONS: And I would like to note that in big print here, it says, "Safeguards: Approaches must always be humane and lawful. Detainees will never" — in capital letters — "be touched in a malicious or unwanted manner." Would that violate — were the actions in this prison in violation of that directive? The allegations and the pictures we've seen, that would be in violation of that directive, would it not?
SANCHEZ: Sir, if those allegations are proved in the investigative process to be true, those would be violations.
SESSIONS: And it said Geneva Conventions must be complied with.
SANCHEZ: Absolutely, sir, that was always the standard.
SESSIONS: Now, General Abizaid or General Sanchez, the Ryder report — General Ryder was the provost marshal. That's the person in change of the military prison system, is that not correct?
ABIZAID: Yes, sir, it's correct.
SESSIONS: He's the Army's top expert on how to house prisoners. And it's not easy in the United States, I'm telling you. Senator Kennedy and I sponsored a bill recently to crack down on sexual abuse in prisons, a prison rape bill, because it happens in American prisons we have abuses. But it's difficult in a theater of combat operation.
You brought him over to help you bring order to this situation in the post-hostility conflict? Is that what you did?
ABIZAID: Yes, sir. We've asked for a lot of help, because we need a lot of help in this theater on a lot of different things.
But what's the most helpful is where commanders travel and look and see with their own eyes what's going on and how it's going on. And General Sanchez and I and others have been all around the theater and talked to interrogators. We've looked to make sure what was happening was right. And we emphasize to them all the time that they need to treat people right.
SESSIONS: Well, things go awry; there's just no doubt about it. And it's more difficult in a combat environment.
General Miller, you had a reputation of being able to manage a prison and to obtain information from detainees in a way that was closely inspected and observed by the Red Cross and other people on a continuing basis.
SESSIONS: And we had soldiers at risk in Iraq. We had civilian leadership of the new Iraqi government at risk of their very lives, as we saw one just killed recently. It certainly would have been wonderful if we'd obtained intelligence so we could have interdicted the latest murder of the head of the council in Iraq.
And, General Abizaid, you said you wanted to get information to the tactical commanders. The American people may not understand this language. Part of the problem was, as I understood it, you're obtaining information, but we're not getting it out to the people who could benefit from having it. Is that fair to say?
ABIZAID: Well, Senator, as I traveled around — and I spend most of my time when I go around going to tactical units — I was extremely impressed by the amount of information that they had about local conditions. And I would always ask them whether once the detainees were evacuated into the prison system, did they receive follow-up information that would help them in their difficult job of breaking down the cellular structures that the enemy uses against us.
And at the same time, General Sanchez and I, probably very early on in General Sanchez arriving in the theater, were concerned that we were not getting a good view of what was happening at the leadership level. So we knew that there had to be a connection between what the tactical units knew and what the leadership knew if we were ever to get at the insurgency base problems that we were seeing out there.
So we were dealing with a systemic problem and we still don't have as good a view as we'd like to have about the nature of the insurgency and who's in charge and where the cells move and how they operate, et cetera. It's an intelligence-intensive task.
SESSIONS: Well, General Miller, one of your responsibilities is to try to make sure that evidence that had been gathered was promptly disseminated.
SESSIONS: And is that one of your responsibilities?
MILLER: That's correct, Senator.
SESSIONS: I think my time's expired.
WARNER: Thank you, very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson?
BEN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here this morning.
General Abizaid, I want to commend you particularly for your candor. This is a city and this group from time to time is used to what I've termed progressive candor. We learned a little bit at a time. And ultimately somebody has to take responsibility. I appreciate very much your willingness to take the responsibility.
General Miller, there are photos showing military intelligence, M.P.s and private contractors in the vicinity of prisoner abuse. We would be — we're being told that it was a handful or a few — the operative word of the day — a few bad apples engaging in activities that were abusive, not consistent with either Geneva Convention rules or with the expectations of the command above them.
So can you tell me who were the participants, who were the abusers in the situation? I'm not aware of anyone outside of a handful of privates, sergeants, et cetera, being charged with anything. What about the private contractors or the military intelligence people, apart from M.P.s, being charged? Or do you know?
MILLER: Senator, those — the events, are part of the investigations being done, also being done now by General Fay involving the intelligence elements, both the military and any of the contractors who would be involved in the intelligence function.
BEN NELSON: Will we expect something within a timely manner on those investigations?
MILLER: Sir, it's my understanding that General Fay's report is nearing close and that those reports will be given to the chain of command very quickly.
BEN NELSON: General Miller, what instructions or orders were you given before you arrived and on your way to Guantanamo?
MILLER: Sir, on my assumption of command of JTF-Guantanamo, I went to the headquarters Southern Command and General Hill laid out his responsibilities for me and gave me the orders.
We had an opportunity to fuse two JTFs together that were not working as successfully; that was the priority mission, to be able to integrate both the detention and intelligence function to produce actionable intelligence for the nation. In this case, operational and strategic intelligence to help us win the global war on terror.
BEN NELSON: Did you talk to any of the civilians within the Department of Defense?
MILLER: Sir, initially I did not. Once I made my assessment at JTF-Guantanamo, then I went to Washington, D.C., and talked to both the intelligence community and others who were a part of the functionalities that we had at Guantanamo, about detentions, interrogation and an intelligence fusion.
BEN NELSON: Any one at the level of undersecretary or assistant secretary of defense?
MILLER: Sir, I did not initially talk, but later on, as the mission in Guantanamo went — as you remember, I was there for 17 months. Then I talked all the way up to the secretary of defense- level, briefing them on the operations that we had and the intelligence that we'd gathered and the integration of those operations throughout Guantanamo.
BEN NELSON: Were any of those discussions directed at what you might do in the future if you were assigned to Abu Ghraib or to Iraq in general?
MILLER: No, sir, they were not.
BEN NELSON: Were there any differences between the two assignments?
MILLER: Senator, there were substantial differences. As you know, JTF-Guantanamo has a responsibility to detain enemy combatants not covered by the Geneva Convention. And so there were specific authorizations and limits that went directly into Guantanamo.
MILLER: And so I became very knowledgeable of those, I read the Geneva Convention, to be frank with you, in great depth, my lawyer probably spent one to two hours a day with me, as I learned every day how to be more effective in doing this job and also doing it to the standards of America: humane detention and interrogation that reflected America's values.
BEN NELSON: Thank you.
General Sanchez, you have suspended the entire chain of command that was under the command of General Karpinski, including General Karpinski. She says she objected to the interference with her command which was represented by Colonel Pappas in bringing intelligence operations in tactical control over the prison. But you disagree that she objected?
SANCHEZ: Senator, General Karpinski never talked to me about any interference in my command.
BEN NELSON: Did she send you a written communication?
SANCHEZ: Sir, she received the same order that assigned responsibility for FOB protection and security of detainees as the other commanders in the task force.
BEN NELSON: Is it usual that a military intelligence officer would take over the tactical command for force protection?
SANCHEZ: Sir, it is dependent upon the senior commander in that forward operating base that has responsibility to defend its soldiers.
BEN NELSON: Do you know of any other instances?
SANCHEZ: The brigade commander, sir — the M.I. brigade commander, no, sir. He was a senior man that was permanently on that forward operating base, and he had responsibilities for protecting the soldier...
BEN NELSON: Merging interrogation and force protection together?
SANCHEZ: Sir, a commander has integral responsibility, independent of his mission, to protect his soldiers. And that was what I was trying to institutionalize.
BEN NELSON: My time has expired. Thank you.
WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins?
COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me begin by thanking all of you for your extraordinary service. One of the tragedies of this abuse scandal is that it not only obscures the fine work that you're doing, but it also overwhelms the thousands of acts of kindness, courage and compassion by our troops every day in Iraq. And that's why this abuse scandal is particularly upsetting.
COLLINS: I feel it sets back and undermines the good work of our troops — the vast majority of our troops.
I have to say that after reading the Taguba report, reviewing the various interviews and participating in these hearings, I remain unclear about the answers to some very basic and critical questions, questions such as who really was in charge of the prison and what was allowed in the treatment of the prisoners.
General Sanchez, at the committee's hearing last week, General Alexander referred to these guidelines, these Interrogation Rules of Engagement, as yours. Numerous press reports have referred to these rules as "The Sanchez guidelines."
But is it your testimony this morning that these guidelines were not issued by your office and that, in fact, you only saw them last week at our hearing?
SANCHEZ: Ma'am, absolutely not. The first time I saw the slide that was specifically shown to me by one of the senators is what I was referring to.
I personally issued the memorandums and I have both memorandums sitting here that I will provide to the committee. Those rules of engagement were my rules of engagement and I personally approved those after I consulted with my higher headquarters and my staff judge advocate.
COLLINS: In response to a question from Senator Reed, you said, however, that you had never approved the presence of dogs, sleep deprivation, stress positions, however, that are listed on these guidelines.
COLLINS: Is that correct?
SANCHEZ: Ma'am, that is exactly right.
COLLINS: General Sanchez, I also want to follow up on your November order putting military intelligence in charge of some aspects of the prison. I also want to explore with you the role of military intelligence in general.
In the Taguba report the general says that the recommendations of General Miller's team that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for the successful exploitation of the detainees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of General Ryder's team and AR 190-8 that military police do not participate in military intelligence-supervised interrogation sessions.
He also says that having military police actively set the favorable conditions for interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
Didn't your order, where you involved the military police in some aspects of the supervision of the prison, run counter to the regulations cited by General Taguba?
ABIZAID: Senator Collins, may I take this?
COLLINS: Yes, General.
ABIZAID: First of all, we do not have all the facts. And I think it's important for the committee to understand that.
We need to see what we're going to hear from the 205th M.I. Brigade. What was in the mind of that commander? What did he think?
So if we can set that aside, let me share with you one of the findings that came out of the Department of the Army I.G. investigations that are preliminary; they're not approved. I'm sure they'll be shared with this committee.
Our doctrine is not right. It's just not right.
ABIZAID: I mean, there are so many things that are out there that aren't right in the way that we operate for this war.
This is a doctrinal problem of understanding where you bring, what do the M.P.s do, what do the military intelligence guys do, how do they come together in the right way. And this doctrinal issue has got to be fixed if we're ever going to get our intelligence right to fight this war and defeat this enemy.
So we've got problems that have to be looked at from top to bottom in order to ensure that there is no confusion, because you see the Ryder report says one thing, the Taguba report will say one thing...
COLLINS: Exactly my point.
ABIZAID: ... you're going to see that the Fay report says something else, and it's not because anybody's lying to anybody; it's because the system is not right.
And there are a lot of systems that are wrong out there that we had better fix if we're going to beat this enemy.
COLLINS: But, General, I guess what concerns me is when you have all these contradictory doctrines, or all these contradictory findings, it suggests to me that there was great confusion at the prison, and that confusion can set the stage for the kinds of unacceptable abuses that occurred. That's my concern.
ABIZAID: It is a concern that I share, Senator, and we will find out the facts.
But I would like to ensure that you understand that there is great confusion in a combat zone all the time, almost as much as there is here in Washington, but not quite.
COLLINS: Thank you, General.
WARNER: Thank you, Senator.
And that confusion in a combat zone goes way back in history.
Senator Dayton?
DAYTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WARNER: History of the country, all conflicts.
DAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to join with others in thanking you for convening this hearing and doing your utmost to get to the bottom of these matters.
But I really question our ability to get down to the truth of what's occurred at six minutes apiece. We've now had 15 of the highest level officials involved in this entire operation, from the secretary of defense to the generals in command, and nobody knew that anything was amiss, no one approved anything amiss, no one did anything amiss.
We have a general acceptance of responsibility, but there's no one to blame except for the people down at the very bottom of one prison, and the focus has been on that, although the International Red Cross report says that there were abuses at 14 different prisons under U.S. control.
DAYTON: And according to the New York Times today, the Red Cross complained in writing on November 6th about some of the abuses that they had witnessed which paralleled the practices that were shown in the pictures, of holding Iraqi prisoners naked in dark, concrete cells for several days at a time, forcing them to wear women's underwear on their heads while being paraded and photographed.
And it characterizes the response of the Army to that complaint as barring unannounced visits by the Red Cross at the prisons. And it cited in particular a letter dated December 24th that the Army had described as evidence of the military promptly addressing the Red Cross concerns, but the action that was taken — the barring of unannounced visits — brings into question what the content of that letter actually was.
The Army's refused to release that letter, citing a tradition of confidentiality in dealing with the international agency. And an Army spokesman declined on Tuesday to characterize the letter or to do discuss what it said about the Red Cross's access to the cell block.
General Sanchez, is that evidence of the transparency of this Army's handling of these matters? How are we going to find anything out if no one will tell us anything or even provide the information that is necessary to evaluate these matters?
SANCHEZ: Senator, I swore to tell you the truth and everything that I've told you in here is the truth.
DAYTON: What is in the December 24th letter to the Red Cross?
SANCHEZ: Sir, I don't recall exactly what — we have the letter, obviously, and I'd have to leave it to the department to provide that letter to you, sir.
DAYTON: Will you release that letter?
SANCHEZ: Sir, as far as I'm concerned, we are transparent within CJTF-7.
DAYTON: Well, sir, all right, I'll accept that then. So you'll provide a copy of that letter and we can assess what the response was?
SANCHEZ: Sir, as long as that is within the approval of the higher headquarters and the department, yes, sir, we will provide that.
DAYTON: That's a big caveat but we'll see what comes forward.
SANCHEZ: Sir, I have no problems with providing you that letter. However, there are higher headquarters directives.
DAYTON: Fair enough.
Sir, on November 19th, you, again according to another newspaper report — as soon as I think our responsibilities in this body are delegated to reading the newspapers and watching the other news reports to find out these things that we're not getting any information about.
But there's reportedly a memo from your office, General Sanchez, on November 19th that placed two key Abu Ghraib cell blocks where the abuses occurred under the control of Colonel Pappas.
And then there's also reference made to a request he made reportedly made to you 11 days later about an interrogation plan for a particular prisoner that involved: First, the interrogators were to throw chairs and tables in the man's presence at the prison and quote, "invade his personal space," close quote.
This is a request from Colonel Pappas, the man to whom you turned over that authority over those two cells.
DAYTON: Then the police were to put a hood on his head and take him to an isolated cell through a gauntlet of barking dogs. There the police were to strip-search him and interrupt his sleep for three days with interrogations, barking and loud music, according to Army documents.
The plan was sent to you — is that one of the 25 requests for additional interrogation techniques that you approved?
SANCHEZ: Sir, first of all, you stated that I issued an order that I specifically put key cell blocks under Colonel Pappas. I never issued such an order.
DAYTON: OK, and...
SANCHEZ: Secondly...
DAYTON: The article's incorrect? That I...
SANCHEZ: Sir, I never issued such an order.
DAYTON: I regret the...
SANCHEZ: And secondly, that request never made it to my headquarters — or to me, personally, rather.
DAYTON: So there wasn't memo on November 19th, to place — from your office — to place these cell blocks under Colonel Pappas?
SANCHEZ: No, sir, I never issued such an order.
DAYTON: All right.
SANCHEZ: And that specific request for interrogation methods — that never...
DAYTON: Let me see that one.
SANCHEZ: ... never got to the CJTF-7 commanding general's level, and I never approved any interrogation methods other than continued segregation.
DAYTON: Thank you.
General Abizaid, you commented on that — we just stay the course. And I, you know, wanted — on behalf of, speaking for myself anyway; I won't presume to speak for my colleagues — but, you know, the Senate has been bipartisanly resolute behind every request the president's made for funding and support.
It's been virtually unanimous. It's been — across the board, the supplemental appropriations, the authorizations, we're taking up now the 2005 authorization. We're adding, at the request of the president, an additional $25 billion for purposes that haven't even been defined.
But I think it's something I wanted to try to get an answer from various authorities: What is that course? And what is the, you know, the direction that we're on?
And just note, in response, particularly to some comments that were made about how well things are going — and I don't know how to sort this out. I want us to succeed there. I just want to be told the truth about whether we are or not so we can assess whether the Minnesotans and other Americans who are serving over there are going to be there for months or years and what their likelihood is of returning safely and alive.
But I refer here to a Washington Post comment made by a Kurdish member of the governing council, that if something is not done about the security situation, there will be no transfer of power.
DAYTON: (inaudible), his name, who is generally pro-American, described the assassination as only the most extreme example of the lawlessness that has grown in the year since President Saddam Hussein was driven from power. Quote, "Never in Iraq has it been like this, never, even under Saddam," he said. "People are killed, kidnapped and assaulted. Children are taken away. Women are raped. No one is afraid of any punishment."
Is that an accurate description of 1 percent of the country? 5 percent? More than that? What is the security situation there, sir?
ABIZAID: Yes, sir, I appreciate the question.
First of all, not only were people carried away in the middle of the night and raped and tortured and killed under Saddam, but it happened at a huge scale, on an institutional scale unequaled in any recent memory and I guess perhaps only rivaled by what the Nazis did.
So are things better just by the mere fact that that regime of torture and intimidation is gone? Yes, that's a good thing.
On the other hand, I won't be Pollyannish about where we are, Senator. This is a hard thing. And it's going to take a long time. And it's going to take a lot of courage and a lot of perseverance and unfortunately more blood, and it's going to take more treasure. But there are more people in Iraq that are working with us to try to make their country a better place than are trying to tear it apart.
The people that are trying to tear it apart are ruthless. They are doing it precisely now for the reasons that I think I've been about as honest as I could be with this committee in the past, because this is the vulnerable time. They must make it fail now. They are pulling out everything that they can to make it fail.
And it's hard. That's why we kept extra forces there. And it's hard and it's tough and it's difficult, but we will prevail. And I'm telling you, you know, there are things that are bad about Iraq, and we are responsible for security. And it's not like walking in downtown Washington, D.C. It's a dangerous place.
But I can tell you, people have a right to express their opinion. There's political activity. There's freedom of the press. There are things that are happening in Iraq that don't happen anywhere else in the Middle East. And we ought to be proud of it.
DAYTON: May I just conclude? My time is up. How soon do you expect the 200 or 4,000 or whatever Iraqi police and militia will be in a position to enforce their own law and order on their city streets?
ABIZAID: Well, Senator, I would have said, before the recent events, that somewhere between September and December they would be ready.
ABIZAID: But we had a setback. We know we had a setback. Putting one of our best officers in the United States military on the job. And I'm saying if the creek don't rise somewhere between January and April they'll be ready.
DAYTON: Thank you.
WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Chambliss?
CHAMBLISS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, let me echo the sentiments of all of our colleagues up here relative to the leadership you're providing and the great job that all the men and women underneath you are doing.
And while we've seen on the front pages of the paper for the last three weeks this story, those of us who follow the details of the battles that your men and women are waging every day know and understand that you have scored major victory after major victory in the last three weeks. And we commend you for the great job you folks are doing right on.
Colonel Warren, would you tell me what is the jurisdiction between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army relative to the arresting, securing, transporting and interrogation of these detainees in Iraq.
Sir, I don't know that it's a matter necessarily of jurisdiction. We do know that other agencies do detain individuals in Iraq. They use the same legal standard under the fourth Geneva Convention, which is that they are imperative threats to security. And once they are brought into a coalition forces detention facility, they are subject to our rules and regulation.
CHAMBLISS: Well, is there any integration or cooperation between the CIA and the Army relative to the securing of prisoners and bringing them to places like Abu Ghraib?
WARREN: Sir, your question is outside the scope of my knowledge. I can speak to the rules that apply once they are inducted. With arrangements relative to operations, I'm unable to speak to that.
CHAMBLISS: General Abizaid, can you answer that question?
ABIZAID: Sir, I would like to answer the question in closed session.
CHAMBLISS: OK.
General Abizaid and General Sanchez, I have asked this question twice before and I still have not gotten a satisfactory answer. And that is, General Ryder was sent to this prison. He was there in late October, early November of 2003. During the very time he was there, these particular incidents that are alleged — the alleged abuses that we're talking about now were ongoing during that point in time. Yet, even though he was asking questions of the conditions of the prison and the condition of the prisoners, nobody told him, apparently, one word about these incidents happening.
Can either of you give me any explanation why that would have happened wh