

MG Miller's Report

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**Assessment of DoD Counterterrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations in
Iraq (U)**

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1. (S/NF) Introduction – From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Geoffrey Miller, US Army, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation (Annex A) to HQ, CJTF-7, Baghdad, to conduct assistance visits to CJTF-7, TF-20, and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to discuss current theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence. The team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations, and detention operations. The team used JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines.

2. (S/NF) Executive Summary – The dynamic operational environment in Iraq requires an equally dynamic intelligence apparatus. To improve velocity and operational effectiveness of counterterrorism interrogation, attention in three major mission areas is needed. The team observed that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. Additionally, the corps commander's information needs required an in-theater analysis capability integrated throughout the interrogation operations structure to allow for better and faster reach-back to other worldwide intelligence databases. Last, the detention operations function must act as an enabler for interrogation.

(S/NF) The command has initiated a system to drive the rapid exploitation of internees to answer CJTF-7, theater, and national level counter terrorism requirements. This is the first stage toward the rapid exploitation of detainees. Receipt of additional resources currently in staffing will produce a dramatic improvement in the speed of delivering actionable intelligence and leveraging the effectiveness of the interrogation efforts. Our assessment is, given the implementation of the attached recommendations, a significant improvement in actionable intelligence will be realized within thirty days.

3. (S/NF) Functions: Integration – Synchronization – Fusion (Point of contact (POC) is MR D [REDACTED])

a. (U) Integration – Defined as: to organize HUMINT collection and analytical resources under a coordinating authority that can rapidly task, direct, conduct analysis, and action intelligence gained from interrogations.

(S/NF) Observation - HUMINT collection and analysis is being performed by several autonomous entities in the theater, resulting in duplication of effort and imperfect information flow.

(S/NF) Recommendation – Establish a robust coordinating authority to direct and coordinate all HUMINT collection and analysis in Iraq. Supplement this authority with a collection management operation focused to support the needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Theater Commander and CJTF-7 Commanders' intelligence and targeting objectives. Additional resources are required for the CJTF-7 CJ2X to sustain this effort.

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(S/NF) Observation - HUMINT collection priorities were not clearly defined, leading to ambiguous collection efforts. There are a large number of collection priorities that require a clear prioritization as to which requirements support the commander's critical information requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress – CJTF-7 CJ2X has established a clear method of prioritization for collection requirements. Requirements are now being combined into areas of focus to drive interrogation tasking and operations.

b. (U) **Synchronization** – Defined as: to establish a defined process and procedure to integrate the prioritization and tasking of all interrogation assets. (POC is MR J [REDACTED])

(S/NF) Observation – No written guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities was disseminated to units.

(S/NF) Recommendation/ Action In-progress – CJTF-7 is drafting approval documents containing the authorities, policies and practices to outline requirements to process, interrogate, and exploit security internees.

(S/NF) Observation - DoD assets and other autonomous entities are active in the theater collecting information and conducting analysis under independent chains of command. Information sharing is not fully integrated. The various organizations are generally unaware of each other's capabilities, interests, and mutual information needs. They also lack protocols for coordinating access to internees, and for sharing the information collected and analysis performed.

(S/NF) Recommendation – CJTF-7 is establishing a HUMINT Collection and Targeting meeting that provides a weekly forum for system information sharing, internee access, and tasking protocols to fully leverage the participation of all entities active in the theater (to include Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Criminal Investigative Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Iraqi Survey Group) to support the CJTF-7 commander's intelligence and targeting objectives.

c. (U) **Fusion** – Fusion is defined as assuring that all required resources and actions to support internee operations are properly integrated, supervised, executed and assessed to support the commander's intent. (POC is [REDACTED])

(S/NF) Observation – The resiliency and global reach of GWOT targets requires much closer cooperation between the strategic analytical community and the collectors and analysts in the field. Military intelligence analysts at the CJTF-7 ACE, CJ2X, and in the field are closely focused on the tactical mission and are generally unaware of the assets and capabilities of the broader national intelligence community and the existence of dedicated CT analytical centers, such as DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

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(S/NF) Recommendation - Expedite the exchange of Counterterrorism information and analysis between collectors in the field and the national intelligence community by integrating the Interrogator Tiger Teams with analysts at the CJTF-7 CJ2X and national intelligence community through JITF-CT. Energize the analysis-collection feedback loop of the intelligence cycle with robust, timely, GWOT oriented, collection management planning and execution.

4. **(U) Interrogation** – Setting the conditions to exploit internees to respond to questions that answer theater commanders' critical questions. (POC is [REDACTED])

(S/NF) Summary - Tactical interrogation operations differ greatly from strategic interrogation operations. The interrogators within CJTF-7 have been accomplishing the tactical mission, at a high rate of professionalism and effectiveness since the beginning of the war. As the CJTF transitions to a new phase of operations, the category of internees to interrogate and analytical backstopping required necessitates transition to strategic interrogation operations. The interrogation mission is hindered by an absence of analytical resources and reach-back data systems. The detention operation does not yet set conditions for successful interrogations. Interrogations are conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations and collection management under one command authority.

(S/NF) Observation - There is minimal analytical support to the interrogation mission. Interrogators continue to use tactical interrogation methods in a transitioning strategic environment.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Establish and train Interrogation Tiger Teams comprised of one interrogator and one analyst, both with SCI access. CJTF-7 has established an initial cadre of integrated Interrogation Tiger Teams from current assets and scheduled deploying interrogators and analysts to attend strategic interrogator and analyst training at Tiger Team University, USAICS, and Fort Huachuca in October 03.

(S/NF) Observation - CJTF-7s two interrogation facilities operate with their own independent collection focus without an integrated coordinating element. Coordination between facilities is conducted informally and inconsistently.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Consolidate the interrogation mission at one Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)/strategic interrogation facility under CJTF-7 command. This action has been initiated.

(S/NF) Observation - Detention operations do not enable the interrogation mission.

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(S/NF) Recommendation - Dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the JIDC Commander that sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees. This action is now in progress.

(S/NF) Observation - The lack of awareness of available analytical databases by interrogators and analysts limits the ability to conduct effective integrated interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Train analysts to incorporate databases including DIMS, CT-link, web-safe, CIA Source, Harmony, and Coliseum in interrogation planning and execution. This training is provided at Tiger Team University and can be leveraged with a sustained theater training program.

(S/NF) Observation - Analysts at JIDC (Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center) interrogation operations section have limited access to automated intelligence systems that would allow the analyst to reach back to national level resources. The primary collection facilities (Abu Gharib) requires at a minimum 2 JWICS terminal to meet full operational capability.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Provide the necessary systems and bandwidth to enable direct analytical support to interrogation operations. See paragraph 6 (Information Technology).

(S/NF) Observation - There is no Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) to support interrogation operations. These teams comprised of operational behavioral psychologists and psychiatrists are essential in developing integrated interrogation strategies and assessing interrogation intelligence production.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Provide 1 BSCT to support interrogation operations.

(S/NF) Observation - The system procedures to rapidly transfer/return fully exploited internee intelligence sources back to the internee general population or recommend their release require assessment and streamlining.

(S/NF) Recommendation – Assess and refine transfer criteria to support continued rapid exploitation of high value internees and the release of fully exploited or low value internees in a more timely manner.

(S/NF) Observation – Task Force 20 (TF-20) lacks adequate number of trained interrogator-analyst Tiger Teams for mission requirements.

(S/NF) Recommendation: That CJTF-7 provide TF-20 Tiger Team support.

(S/NF) Observation – The application of emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches and operational art. Legal review and

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recommendations of internee interrogation operations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness.

(S/NF) Recommendation – Dedicate a judge advocate(s) to advise commanders and interrogation leadership on requirements to operate within approved interrogation authorities, responsible for the detention and intelligence missions. This action is in progress.

5. (U) Detention Operations (POC is [REDACTED])

(U) Functions – Provide a safe, secure and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.

(S/NF) Summary - The importance of the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence is vital for success and must be emphasized in the conduct of detention operations. It is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees. Joint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by lack of active control of the internees within the detention environment. The pending establishment of the theater joint interrogation detention center at Abu Gharib will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized and focused strategic interrogation effort.

(S/NF) Observation – Minimal operational procedures and guidance were available for internee in-processing, collection and integration of intelligence, security procedures, internee discipline standards and procedures for reacting to emergencies situations in the detention facilities.

(S/NF) Recommendation – Develop a comprehensive set of detention physical security SOPs. Conduct training for detention center leadership and staff on the implementation of these procedures. JTF-GTMO SOPs for physical security and detention operations were provided to CJTF-7 staff.

(S/NF) Observation – Some of the detention facility guard force interviewed were unable to apply their standing orders and Rules of Engagement procedures to hypothetical situations – e.g. escaping internees.

(S/NF) Recommendations – Scenario-based training for the current operational and future theater operational environment is recommended to ensure standing procedures (e.g. Rules of Engagement) are known and their application thoroughly understood by the detention leadership and staff.

(S/NF) Observation – Detention operations must be structured to ensure detention environment focuses the internee's confidence and attention on their interrogators. The MP detention staff should be an integrated element supporting the interrogation functions and received orientation training to support interrogation operations.

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(S/NF) Recommendation – Assign, train, and sustain interrogator and detention staff team building focused on improving the collection of intelligence. MP detention staff training programs utilized by JTF-GTMO were provided to CJTF-7 for consideration and baseline implementation.

Observation – Disciplinary procedures for internees are arbitrary or not clearly defined

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress – The unit is updating its operating procedures for implementing disciplinary measures related to detainee operations.

(S/NF) Observation – Males, females and juveniles are detained in the same camp in close proximity to each other. Full utilization of a classification system that is sensitive to group dynamics is not currently in place.

(S/NF) Recommendation/Action In-progress – Procedures to segregate males, females, and juvenile internees in the detention facility to prevent unauthorized contact are being refined.

(S/NF) Observation- Some detainees who had infectious medical conditions were detained in the general internee population. This mingling of internees could result in possible contamination of other detainees and soldier detention staff. Detainees suffering from apparent mental illness were segregated in a holding pen that was normally used for disciplinary purposes.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Special needs sections of the detention facility should be developed for internees with contagious medical conditions and internees who exhibit mental illness.

6. (U) Information Technology (IT) (POC is [REDACTED])

(U) Functions – IT focus is streamlined information gathering resulting in rapid intelligence analysis and exploitation.

(S/NF) Observation- Current information management systems do not support rapid, integrated exploitation of intelligence community databases.

(S/NF) Recommendation - Create a robust automated knowledge center, incorporating information and documents currently located in diverse data stores to allow for sharing of all information on internees. (See Annex B for specific IT comments.)

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7. **(U) Conclusion** - Actions to improve the Task Force's ability to conduct counterterrorist strategic interrogations were being developed at the time of this report's drafting. Provision of resources is crucial to success. Expedient fill of two leadership billets - one as Chief of the HUMINT Operations Center (HOC) and the other as Chief, HUMINT Analysis Center (HAC), CJTF-7, is essential to enable successful joint, integrated interrogation operations. Concurrently, assignment of expert analysts is required to form Tiger Teams and populate the HAC.

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Major General, U.S. Army

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Annex A: Assessment Team Members

Team Leader

MG Geoffrey Miller, USA JTF-GTMO Commander

Synchronization Team

MR [REDACTED]	DIA	Former JTF-GTMO Joint Interrogation Group Dir.
MR [REDACTED]	DIA/DHS	Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele.Chief
MR [REDACTED]	CIA	Former JTF-GTMO CTC Chief
CDR [REDACTED] USNR	JTF-CT	Former JTF-GTMO Analysis Chief
LTC [REDACTED] USA	JATF SOUTH	Former JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate
CPT [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Information Technology Chief
MR [REDACTED]	CITF	Former JTF-GTMO Crim. Invest. Task Force Chief

Interrogation Operations Team

LtCol [REDACTED] USAF	DIA/DHS	Former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Ele Chief
CW3 [REDACTED] USA	470 th MI BDE	Former GTMO Saudi Team Chief
CW3 [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Central Asia Team Chief
SSGT [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Central Asia Team Analyst
MSG [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Saudi Team Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge
SSG [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Saudi Team Analyst
SSG [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Special Projects Interrogator
SSG [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Special Projects Analyst

Detention Operations Team

CSM [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Camp Delta Superintendent
CPT [REDACTED] USA	JTF-GTMO	Camp Delta Company Commander

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Annex B: Information Technology Solutions

The goal of a theater-wide intelligence information technology initiative is *fused intelligence* which will allow for a faster interrogation cycle, faster exchange of information, minimize manual processes, eliminate redundancy, manpower savings, rapid data mining, focused interrogation plan, and an automated collection plan.

ISSUES

- There isn't sufficient bandwidth or connectivity available to support current interrogation operations and consolidated internee database for near-real time information sharing
 - o Some locations have SIPR connectivity but it is slow and unreliable. Some locations do not have enough SIPR drops to support the mission and personnel.
- There are diverse data stores to include MS Excel spreadsheets, MS Access databases, MS Word documents that are not shared by the various internee camps
 - o There isn't a theater level network that reaches out to all the units for the purpose of sharing folder, files, and documents, with the exception of email. Email is not an effective way of sharing information for the purpose of conducting data mining and intelligence exploitation.
- There are no standardized information gathering and reporting methods that will allow for tracking of information collected from internees from the time of capture and through the intelligence requirements management and interrogation process.
 - o There isn't a comprehensive collection management and dissemination system in place.
- There isn't an effective method to link internees to other internees or associates, organizations, locations, and facilities or to associate documents to internees to allow analysts to quickly search all information pertaining to an internee.

