

came, as a last resort, to Placerita and adjoining canyons—thinking to tide over the stress until times were better. Some of the claim owners allowed men to mine free. Others took a small royalty. Those tyro miners who brought their families, lived in hastily constructed "shacks," or in tents; women and children helping to wash the auriferous gravel, securing for their labor sufficient to feed them. In the language of the miner, they made "grub."

Grub mining is, and for many years has been, a feature of the little placers. Men there are who are content to work with rocker in winter and dry washer in summer for the bare necessities—that is, necessities from the standpoint of grubstake miners.

I once heard two partners—those miners usually work together in twos—planning the expenditure of a "clean-up." They estimated the total value at three dollars and six bits. After careful consideration of all their needs, they allotted: Four bits for flour, four bits for bacon, four bits for beans; one dollar for tobacco, one dollar for a bottle of whisky and two bits over the bar of the saloon.

Strange characters have drifted into the Placerita, seeking temporary refuge from a passing storm on life's turbulent sea.

The Buffalo man for whose apprehension a life insurance company offered a standing reward worked with pick and shovel to "make the dirt" to be rocked out by the "woman in the case"—the same who, later, betrayed him. A year or more of the hiding of these people was spent in the Placerita—where they mined for "grub."

For sixteen years the Placerita has furnished 48,000 gallons of water daily, pumped through a four-inch pipe line, to the Pico oil fields, nine miles distant.

Notwithstanding a hundred years of gold mining and a never-failing stream of water—a factor in the production of \$13,000,000 of oil, nature in the Placerita seems not yet content with the blessings already allotted.

ELEANOR QUIGLEY.

Honor to Whom Honor Is Due

—A Military Critique—

By Major Ben C. Truman

NOW that all the army commanders on both sides of the civil war have passed away—except one, Longstreet—and also nearly all the statesmen of that day, the compilers of history are examining the records, and the few remaining newspaper correspondents of that strife are occasionally presenting their observations and opinions, some of which they were too patriotic and considerate to publish while the great leaders who fought to the best of their ability were still alive.

With the exception of the great Thomas, all of the army commanders upon the Union side committed serious blunders, although many of them became illustrious before the end, while a number of the most distinguished commanders became overwhelmed with adverse circumstances—conspicuously Rosecrans and Buell, who did the country eminent service at times and who deserved better than they secured at the hands of their countrymen.

Undoubtedly, Buell saved Grant's army from destruction at Shiloh and turned Bragg back from his threatened invasion of Louisville and Cincinnati. As to the service of General Rosecrans, aside from his successes at various points in 1861-2, his victory at Stone River, December 31, 1862, and January 1-2, 1863, freed Middle Tennessee almost entirely of a large rebel army, and his subsequent operation from Murfreesboro to Stevenson was of incalculable account to our commanders further west and in the east.

Buell's withdrawal from about Chattanooga to the Ohio river staggered the authorities at Washington and angered Andrew Johnson so acutely that he pronounced Buell a traitor and forced his removal from active service. The fact is the plans of Bragg in detail became known to Buell, showing that an evasion of the latter's army and an invasion of the north was intended. Hence the forced marches, so widely criticized as a retreat, to place his army between Kirby and the north. The hasty organization against Kirby Smith to delay his advance on Cincinnati and the rapid movement to Louisville were the steps which really defeated Bragg. His designs were frustrated by Buell's marching. He was driven from Kentucky by the battle of Perryville. This was really a fight in retreat for Bragg, and only a portion of the Union army became engaged. The real battle, Stone River, resulting from Bragg's advance north of the Tennessee, occurred near Murfreesboro. For this campaign General Rosecrans was placed in command. He received from his predecessor an army in excellent organization and good heart. Buell was the victim of circumstances and not understood in time. All added light thrown on the history of this army shows that his fame should be henceforth an increasing one.

The Tullahoma campaign, which was the movement after Stone River for the possession of Tennessee, the campaign for the capture of Chattanooga, and the subsequent battles about Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge reflect credit on all concerned.

The Tullahoma campaign, for which, in connection with Chickamauga, General Rosecrans has received so much ignorant censure, shows it to be, what those who carried it on and participated in it have always known it to be, namely, one of the most brilliant and successful of the strategic victories of the war; for Rosecrans, with an army of 60,000 effective men, compelled Bragg, with an army of 44,000 effective men, to fall back further and from better natural

positions in nine days, with a loss of less than 600 men killed, wounded and missing than the united armies under Sherman were able to compel the same army, with but slight additional strength under General Joe Johnson, to fall back, in four months of active field campaigning, with a very much larger relative loss. The proportion of the forces of the opposing armies during the Tullahoma campaign was far nearer equal than that on to Atlanta, while the natural and military obstacles to be overcome were largely the greater in the Tullahoma campaign.

To those who still live and remember this campaign General Rosecrans needs no vindication. All such freely render him credit and high praise. Those who from want of knowledge are doubtful will find that their doubts have no foundation as they carefully examine the records.

But what is known as General Rosecrans's Chattanooga campaign was the most harmful to his career, and especially as the great Thomas did undoubtedly save the Army of the Cumberland from destruction. But the campaign, as conceived by Rosecrans and executed by his splendid army, which fought and won the bloodiest battle of the war at Chickamauga as the price of Chattanooga, has never appeared a mystery, nor the battle anything but an essential victory to all unprejudiced military minds. As generally received, the story of Chickamauga is that Rosecrans, having occupied Chattanooga, marched out to attack Bragg, was defeated and routed at Chickamauga, and driven back into Chattanooga.

The truth is that Chattanooga was never in possession of the Army of the Cumberland in a military sense until after the battle of Chickamauga, which Rosecrans fought in the rear of the town for its possession. At the opening of the movement Bragg occupied Chattanooga, on the south bank of the Tennessee, and had strongly fortified it. Rosecrans made a feint of crossing above the town, and crossed thirty miles below. Scaling two very difficult mountain ranges, he came down into the valley some fifteen or twenty miles in rear of Chattanooga. Bragg evacuated the place and retired to Lafayette, behind Pigeon mountain. Rosecrans started to occupy Chattanooga. He was delayed two days by McCook, who held his right, failing to move promptly in concentration on the rest of the army. Meantime Bragg was reinforced by Longstreet from Virginia, and felt strong enough to try to reoccupy Chattanooga. The head of the two armies, each marching for the town, met at Chickamauga, on a field from seven to ten miles outside of the city, and a two days' battle ensued. By the breaking of the Union army on the morning of the second day only five brigades were cut off from the general line. The rest of the army remained intact and fought the battle through. The Army of the Cumberland could have continued on the field at the close of the fight, but the passes in Missionary Ridge, which controlled Chattanooga, were in its rear. If General Thomas had not occupied them that night, the Confederates might have done so, and thus secured Chattanooga. By leaving the field, which was of no consequence to either side, and taking fast hold of the prize for which the field was fought, the Army of the Cumberland obtained the objective of its campaign, and held it to the close of the war. And this is the measure of the victory.

The solid services of General George H. Thomas took on additional glorious light. Indeed, Chickamauga is rightfully regarded as his chief glory. But he was equally great at the storming of Missionary Ridge and at Nashville. In short, he was always great, and always successful, from Mill Spring to Nashville; but as the "Rock of Chickamauga" he will ever be best known to all, even outside of the Army of the Cumberland.

As I have said before, after the great leaders upon both sides have been dead for years, and generations of writers have examined carefully and unimpassioned into all the details of campaigns and contests as presented by army officers and by war correspondents from both sections, there will be as true histories of the late civil war as can be written, and if the writers do their duty, as they undoubtedly will, there will be some surprising things said concerning the Atlanta campaign.

The country at large will always honor Sherman, who may be termed the military genius of the war. But it may come out some time that the grizzly old hero entertained so much prejudice against the Army of the Cumberland and two of its greatest fighters—Thomas and Hooker—and so much more regard for the Army of the Tennessee than for any other army, that the victory which gave us Atlanta cost the country tens of thousands of lives and a hundred millions of dollars more than it should. The true historian may yet tell the world that "Joe" Johnston's army might have been captured at Resaca had Sherman listened to Thomas and Hooker and other general officers of the Army of the Cumberland. Thomas begged Sherman at least to let Hooker, with his Twentieth corps, move according to his (Thomas') plan.

"We can capture the whole rebel army," said Thomas.

"I can do that with the Army of the Tennessee," replied Sherman; "besides, I am not fond of Hooker. He isn't to be relied on, and thinks too much of 'Fighting Joe.'"

The Army of the Tennessee had its hands too full to carry out what Sherman had hoped; the Army of the Cumberland became engaged when it was too late, and the gamecock of the southern army got away, leaving more Federal than Confederate dead and wounded on the field.

At Kennesaw mountain Sherman was besought to make a flank movement rather than attack in front. But he banged away until he had lost several thousand men, and would have been thrashed to pieces

if he hadn't had more than two to one of the rebels, got badly defeated, and then executed the movement as urged by Thomas, Hooker, King, Carlin, Schofield, Wood, Dick Johnson and Jeff C. Davis.

The Army of the Cumberland laid off and listened to the tremendous cannonade and clash of small arms and the rebel yell all day upon the 22d of July, when McPherson was killed and 16,000 soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee placed hors de combat, and was not called upon to participate. In company with General John H. King I called upon Thomas late in the afternoon, and he said:

"There is something terrible going on over there on the left, and I am expecting orders every minute. I am afraid, by the sound, that the Army of the Tennessee is getting the worst of it."

In the evening we called on Hooker, who had just returned from a "reconnaissance" with his aide, "Reddy" Stetson, youngest son of Stetson of the Astor House, and the first thing Hooker said was:

"Old Tecumseh has had hell on our left all day. He wanted to take Atlanta without our help, and has lost McPherson and eight or ten thousand men, so I hear. I am senior officer and the command should come to me. But the old lunatic will probably give it to Logan or Howard. He will never forgive me for my success on the 20th (the brilliant battle of Peach Tree Creek). Well, I can stand it if he can. I was sent out here to fight, but he does not seem to require my services. I forced the rebels on the 20th, and we hurled them back on Atlanta without a gun being fired by the Army of the Tennessee. I haven't seen Sherman since. He must be terribly disgusted with me. The only way to take Atlanta is to move upon it with every available man and gun, or flank it."

Sherman lost nearly 17,000 men on the 22d, and shortly afterward flanked the stronghold and captured it without great loss. Still, we succeeded; and who knows but that it might have been worse, after all?

The world has not produced many illustrious warriors who have not been severely criticised. Success is the thing in battle, and he is the greatest general who wins the most fights. Yet where would have been Grant at Shiloh without Buell? Where would have been Meade at Gettysburg without Hancock? And where would have been Rosecrans at Chickamauga without Thomas?—the general who won the first good fight in the west at Mill Spring, Ky., and who wound up things in that department by annihilating Hood's army near Nashville three years afterward—the only time an army was actually annihilated during the war.

Another blunder and a most wanton destruction of life was Sherman's unsuccessful assault on Kennesaw mountain. In my summary for the New York Times of the campaign which ended at Atlanta in August, 1864, I severely criticised the battle of Atlanta, in which we lost McPherson and nearly 17,000 troops, and also the assault on Kennesaw, which resulted in a needless slaughter. In response to the latter I received a letter from Colonel Dayton, Sherman's chief of staff, which contains the following paragraph:

"For the assault on Kennesaw most excellent reasons may be given, reasons which ought to be conclusive, and not the oft-quoted ones, that it was necessary to show that our troops could fight as well as maneuver, but that the weather (as you know) was so bad that the supplies could not be transported to any distance from the railroad; maneuvers, of the character subsequently adopted with success, were not possible at that time, and the only alternative was to do nothing until the weather cleared and the roads improved, or to assault. There was a fair chance to carry some point in the enemy's line. If the assault had succeeded it would have been a decisive event. But as a failure the venture was at least justified on sound military principles, as our maneuvers were resumed as soon as the weather permitted. They were, in short, the very reasons which have always justified an assault before entering upon a siege, and they were perfectly applicable to this case."

But Dayton was totally wrong. Assaults on fortified positions like those at Kennesaw, Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor were rank folly. For had they or other of their kind succeeded, the defensive army, having a secure line of retreat, suffers less than the assaulting army, while, if they fail, as they generally will, the case is still worse.

The assault on Kennesaw, if it succeeded, would not have been "a decisive event," because as Sherman had not occupied Johnson's line of communications in force, the latter would only have been compelled to fall back and take up another defensive position, with a loss in the action probably not nearly as great as that he would have inflicted upon his adversary.

The armies, both north and south, which fought in our civil war, were not to be stamped like a flock of Egyptian sheep, because they had lost a single position, but were always ready to fight in another the very next day. The phrase about "entering upon a siege" was simply silly. There was nothing to besiege at Kennesaw. The operations were strictly those of field armies. The reasons "which have always justified an assault before entering upon a siege" did not exist at Kennesaw in any form or shape. Some of these reasons are, for example, when an army is marching to relieve the besieged, or when climatic or other reasons make haste necessary. Caesar illustrated the assault upon when he defeated the Pompeian army at Herda in Spain. He placed himself upon his enemy's line of retreat, there he fortified, and by skillful maneuvers hemmed in his adversary and finally compelled a whole army, nearly or quite as strong as his own, to surrender